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Abstract
We model the labor market impact of the key provisions of the national and Massachusetts
mandate-based" health reforms: individual mandates, employer mandates, and subsidies. We
characterize the compensating dierential for employer-sponsored health insurance (ESHI) and
the welfare impact of reform in terms of sucient statistics." We compare welfare under
mandate-based reform to welfare in a counterfactual world where individuals do not value
ESHI. Relying on the Massachusetts reform, we nd that jobs with ESHI pay $2,812 less an-
nually, somewhat less than the cost of ESHI to employers. Accordingly, the deadweight loss of
mandate-based health reform was approximately 8 percent of its potential size.
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The 2010 U.S. national health reform and the 2006 Massachusetts state health reform both
focus on expanding health insurance coverage to near-universal levels. These mandate-based"
reforms rely on three key provisions to expand coverage: 1) a mandate that individuals obtain
coverage or pay a penalty, 2) a mandate that employers oer coverage or pay a penalty, and 3)
expansions in publicly subsidized coverage. While regulatory policy has long relied on mandates (for
example, command and control regulation of technologies to reduce pollution), public policies that
mandate that individuals purchase privately supplied goods have little precedent. Such mandates
are suciently unprecedented, in fact, that uncertainty about whether the individual mandate was
constitutional at the national level was not resolved until the Supreme Court upheld it in June 2012.
Despite the resolution of legal questions around mandate-based policy, the question of economic
eciency remains.
To inform the application of mandate-based policy in health reform, as well as additional ap-
plications in other settings, we develop a simple model of mandate-based health reform. Our
model incorporates the three key features of the national and Massachusetts health reforms. Using
this model, we characterize the compensating dierential for employee-sponsored health insurance
(ESHI)the causal change in wages associated with gaining ESHIand we derive a set of sucient
statistics that capture the impact of the reforms on the labor market and on welfare. Although
these sucient statistics arise from potentially complex and dicult-to-measure structural param-
eters that determine individual health insurance and labor supply decisions, we can recover them
from easily measured changes in labor market outcomes. Our model builds on the work of Summers
(1989) who models a full-compliance employer mandate. The central insight of that model is that
mandate-based policy has the potential for eciency in achieving policy goals if individuals value
the mandated benets that they receive through their employers. We apply the model to current
policy by allowing for a pay-or-play employer mandate and adding a pay-or-play individual mandate
and expansions in subsidized coverage. In practice, the interaction of dierent mandates changes
some of the predictions of the Summers model. For example, Summers (1989) gives us the intuition
that an employer mandate reduces deadweight loss in the labor market relative to a tax. The ex-
tension we develop, incorporating all of the policy features into one model, demonstrates that that
intuition does not hold if there is already an individual mandate in place.
Based on the structure implied by our theory, we then estimate the relationship between ESHI
and the labor market, allowing us to empirically assess the impact of health reform on welfare.
Using variation induced by the Massachusetts health reformwhich mirrors the national reform in
all of the elements of our modelwe estimate the empirical analog of our model. We rst estimate
the compensating dierential for health insurance. Our empirical strategy relies on exogenous shifts
into and out of ESHI induced by reform. Using longitudinal data from the Survey of Income and
Program Participation on wages, employment, and hours worked, we study changes in labor market
outcomes for individuals who switch to and from ESHI over the reform period. We incorporate
individual xed eects to control for time-invariant attributes that determine an individual's labor
market outcomes, and we incorporate variation between Massachusetts and other states to control
for national trends. We also incorporate variation in rm size to allow some rms to be exempt
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from the employer mandate and to control for variation in the Massachusetts labor market that is
unrelated to the reform. Combining all of these sources of variation and the reform allows us to
obtain causal estimates of the compensating dierential associated with health insurance.
Adding a small amount of structure to the estimated compensating dierential for health in-
surance, we estimate the sucient statistics that determine the welfare impact of health reform.
Specically, our model allows us to recover the cost of ESHI to employers, the underlying worker
valuation of ESHI, the labor supply and demand elasticities, and the magnitude of the behavioral
responses to the key policy provisions of the Massachusetts reform (the individual and employer
mandates and subsidies). Once we demonstrate that these parameters are sucient statistics for
welfare analysis, we use our estimates to compute the deadweight loss associated with the mandate-
based reform in Massachusetts. We also compare our estimated deadweight loss to the deadweight
loss of a counterfactual tax-based insurance expansion that would involve levying a wage tax to pay
for the provision of health insurance directly.
We nd a compensating dierential for ESHI that is of the expected theoretical sign though
somewhat smaller in magnitude than the full cost of health insurance, suggesting moderately high
average valuation of the benet among the newly insured. Consistent with the large compensating
dierential, we nd a small hours dierential between jobs with and without ESHI, also suggesting
moderately high average valuation of the benet among the newly insured. Translating our esti-
mated compensating and hours dierentials into sucient statistics for welfare analysis, we nd that
mandate-based reform is a relatively ecient way to expand coverage. We estimate that mandate-
based coverage expansion in Massachusetts resulted in a deadweight loss due to distortion of the
labor market that was only 7.7 percent of the distortion associated with instead providing health
insurance through a tax on wages that workers do not link to receiving insurance. The relative
eciency of mandate-based reform follows from the high estimated valuation of the newly insured;
because people were willing to work for ESHI as well as wages, the distortion to the labor market of
mandating insurance was relatively small. We examine the robustness of our estimates to a variety
of alternative specications. Although our estimates vary, they always show that mandate-based
reform is substantially more ecient than tax-based reform because our nding that individuals
value ESHI is very robust.
Apart from our theoretical contributions, our ndings contribute to the empirical literature on
the incidence of fringe benets, with health insurance as the largest of those benets. Typically,
the endogeneity of fringe benets and labor market outcomes leads researchers to nd wrong-signed
compensating dierentials for fringe benets (see Gruber [2000] and Currie and Madrian [1999]
for reviews); most studies nd that individuals who receive more fringe benets also receive higher
wages. Existing studies that do not nd wrong-signed compensating dierentials for health insurance
rely on incremental changes in the cost of health insurance, such as premium increases due to the
addition of mandated maternity benets (Gruber 1994) or increasing malpractice costs (Baicker
and Chandra 2005). By using variation from the Massachusetts reform, we nd a compensating
dierential for the full cost of health insurance; individuals who receive ESHI receive wages that
are lower by approximately the amount their employer spends on ESHI.
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While our focus is squarely on the application of the model to health insurance and, specically,
the mandate-based reforms in the ACA and Massachusetts, our approach has applications more
broadly in considering the value of fringe benets. Our framework ties labor market outcomes to
the market for fringe benets as a function of a small set of parameters. We believe that our model
has potential for future applications both in evaluating the roll out of the ACAwhere each state
will have dierent underlying conditions in the labor and insurance market-as well as in other
markets (e.g., evaluating changes in pension oerings). Our work also complements recent work by
Aizawa and Fang (2013). Their model evaluates similar welfare questions on the interaction between
health policy and the labor market but requires additional structure. Thus, our approach provides a
complementary set of results that evaluate similar policy questions with fewer assumptions required
to both identify the impacts of reform as well as to estimate welfare.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 1 discusses the provisions of Massachusetts and national
reforms that are likely to aect the labor market. Based on these provisions, Section 2 develops a
theory of mandate-based health reform that we use to characterize the compensating dierential for
ESHI and the welfare impact of mandate-based health reform relative to tax-based health reform;
Section 3 discusses identication and estimation of the model. Section 4 introduces the data. Section
5 presents results and discusses robustness, and Section 6 concludes.
1 Massachusetts Health Reform, the Affordable Care Act, and the Labor
Market
The Massachusetts health reform, passed in April 2006, and the federal Patient Protection and
Aordable Care Act (the ACA), passed in March 2010, contain a number of similar provisions
that are likely to aect the labor market. We provide a side-by-side comparison in Appendix A.
The cornerstone of both reforms is the individual mandate to purchase health insurance. Unlike
traditional full-compliance mandates, the individual mandate in both reforms is a pay-or-play"
mandate that allows individuals to pay a penalty if they choose not to comply. The penalty in
Massachusetts for those who were unable to demonstrate they had coverage when they led their
taxes was initially $219 per person per year, and it increased to 50 percent of the cost of the least
generous (Bronze) plan available in the Massachusetts health insurance exchange (the Connector)
in 2008.1 The penalty associated with the ACA individual mandate, which will be phased in
beginning in 2014, is the higher of $695 per uninsured member of the household (up to three) or 2.5
percent of household income. Compliance with the individual mandate in Massachusetts has been
highover 97 percent of tax lers submitted the tax form to comply with the individual mandate
in 2008, and less than 2 percent reported any spell of uninsurance (Massachusetts Health Connector
and Department of Revenue 2010).2
1According to the Massachusetts Connector website in 2010, in the zip code 02138 (Cambridge, MA), the cost of
a Bronze plan for a family in Cambridge with two 40-year-old parents was $11,000 annually. For a couple with two
individuals aged 35, the Bronze plan cost $6,600 annually. A 31-year-old purchasing a Bronze would expect to pay
$2,868.
2To satisfy the mandate, health insurance must meet or exceed a specic value (called minimum creditable
coverage"). See Kaiser Family Foundation (2009) and Raymond (2007). Individuals are automatically exempt from
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Second, both reforms include a pay-or-play employer mandate, which requires employers to oer
health insurance or pay a penalty. The Massachusetts reform requires employers with 11 or more
full-time employees to oer their workers the option to purchase health insurance coverage. Health
coverage options must include a plan that allows employees to purchase health insurance using
pre-tax wages, and employers must contribute at least 33 percent of the value of the premium or
they will be assessed a penalty of $295 per employee per year. The ACA incorporates a similar
pay-or-play employer mandate, but it denes large employers as those with 50 or more full-time
employees (Kaiser Family Foundation 2010b). The ACA also requires that coverage options be
aordable, such that the insurance oered pays at least 60 percent of covered expenses and the
employee is not required to pay more than 9.5 percent of family income for individual coverage
(Burkhauser, Lyons, and Simon 2011). If the employer does not oer coverage, the penalty is $2,000
per full-time employee, excluding the rst 30 employees. If the employer does not oer options that
meet the denition of aordable, and employees enroll in subsidized coverage through an exchange,
the employer must pay a penalty of $3,000 per employee who obtains subsidized coverage, up to
a maximum of $2,000 times the total number of employees minus 30 (Kaiser Family Foundation
2010a). Despite the relatively low penalty, compliance in Massachusetts has been high.3
The third cornerstone of both reforms is the establishment of subsidized coverage for those with
incomes too high to qualify for fully subsidized Medicaid coverage. In Massachusetts, this coverage
is oered by the state at no premium to those with incomes below 150 percent of the federal poverty
level (FPL) ($27,795 for a family of three in 2011).4 Those earning less than 150 percent of the
FPL have access to traditional Medicaid (MassHealth) or new free CommCare plans. Individuals
between 150 and 300 percent of the FPL can purchase CommCare plans with subsidies that decline
with income. Similarly, the ACA expands Medicaid eligibility to all those with incomes below
133 percent of poverty.5 The Supreme Court ruled that states could opt not to expand Medicaid
eligibility under the ACA without losing existing Medicaid funding, and it remains to be seen which,
if any, states will do so. The ACA also extends subsidized coverage higher up the income distribution
to 400 percent of poverty ($74,120 for a family of three). Even though the national reform extends
subsidies to families with higher incomes, the Massachusetts subsidies (Commonwealth Connector
the individual mandate penalty in Massachusetts if they have a gap in creditable coverage of three months or less in a
given calendar year, if they claim a religious exemption, or if their annual income is under 150 percent of the federal
poverty level (eectively because the lowest cost Connector plan would be free for them). Other individuals can le
for an exemption based on aordability using the Certicate of Exemption Application, which also provides details on
the denition of minimum creditable coverage. (The application is available at https://www.mahealthconnector.
org/portal/binary/com.epicentric.contentmanagement.servlet.ContentDeliveryServlet/FindInsurance/
Individual/Affordability2520Calculator/2011CertificateofExemption.pdf, accessed December 1, 2011.)
3Only approximately 4.6 percent of employers large enough to be subject to the penalty (12 percent of all Mas-
sachusetts employers) were required to pay it in 2010 (Massachusetts DHCFP 2011b). In addition, employers are
subject to a separate free rider surcharge" penalty if they do not oer a plan that allows employees to purchase
health insurance using pre-tax wages and instead an employee receives care through the state's uncompensated care
pool. The compliance cost for employers to avoid this penalty is minimal. Accordingly, zero employers were liable
for the free rider surcharge in scal years 2008 and 2009 (Massachusetts DHCFP 2011a).
4In the 48 contiguous states and the District of Columbia, the 2011 poverty line is $10,890 for a single individual,
and it grows by $3,820 for each additional family member (Federal Register 2011).
5Eectively, eligibility will be extended to 138 percent of poverty because there is a special deduction of income
under 5 percent of poverty (Kaiser Family Foundation 2010b).
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2011a,b) are more generous than the national subsidies (Kaiser Family Foundation 2010b) for almost
all incomes and family sizes.
2 Model of Mandate-Based Health Reform and the Labor Market
In this section, we incorporate the three key features of the ACA and the Massachusetts reform
into a simple model of mandate-based health reform and the labor market. Using our model,
we characterize the compensating dierential for health insurance and the welfare impact of health
reform. Our model extends the model pioneered by Summers (1989) (hereafter the Summers model)
and subsequently used by Gruber and Krueger (1991), Gruber (1994), Buchmueller, DiNardo, and
Valetta (2011), and Anand (2011), among others. Our extensions capture the salient features of
the Massachusetts and national reforms that aect the labor market, bringing the model closer
to actual policy. By taking all of the key features of the Massachusetts and national reforms into
account, we enrich the empirical content of the model and contribute to the literature on the impact
of health reform on the labor market.6 These extensions also allow us to capture the interactions
between policies, yielding additional insight. Specically, we explore the Summers model result that
an employer mandate reduces deadweight loss relative to a tax and nd that it does not hold if
there is already an individual mandate in place.
We are primarily interested in the application of our model to the health insurance market in
this paper. However, our approach can be applied in a variety of other settings to evaluate alternate
policies. Our simple approach relies on the observation that the value to individuals of an employer-
provided benet is manifest in labor market outcomes. Generalizing our model to other settings
where the value of mandated benets (or other goods) can be identied by market outcomes will
allow for similar welfare assessments.
2.1 The Model
We begin by considering labor demand. A representative rm sets wages to maximize prots,
resulting in the following labor demand function:
LtD = L
ESHI,t
D (w + b)ESHIt + L
NoESHI,t
D (w + ρtb)(1− ESHIt).
Willingness to demand hours of work L in period t is a function LESHI,tD or L
NoESHI,t
D of the
monetary hourly wage w, and other arguments, depending on an indicator for whether the rm
provides health insurance ESHIt at time t.
7 If the rm provides health insurance, labor demand
6Krueger and Kuziemko (2011) consider the implications of the ACA on coverage for the uninsured, Pohl (2011)
considers the implications of the ACA for the labor supply of single mothers, and Heim and Lurie (2012) consider
the implications of the Massachusetts reform for the self-employed.
7We develop the model relying on the simplifying assumption that we can measure L in hours of work including
nonworkers with zero hours, ignoring the potential dierence between the extensive and intensive margin of employ-
ment. When we estimate the model, we relax this assumption in a series of specication checks that allow us to
compare the intensive and extensive margin impacts in Massachusetts. We also note that we do not measure L as the
probability of employment because only employed workers can have ESHI. We do not measure L as the number of
employees because the goal of our model is to make predictions about labor market outcomes for individual workers
6
depends solely on the cost of employing an individual in dollar termswages and the dollar cost to
the employer of a standard health insurance benet b. There are two periods: Before and After.
The employer mandate is not in place before reform, implying ρBefore = 0, but it is in place after
reform, implying ρAfter = ρ. If the rm does not provide health insurance, labor demand depends
on the wage and the per-worker penalty ρtb for not complying with the employer mandate in place
in period t (since b is a xed dollar amount, we express the employer penalty as a fraction of b
instead of a xed dollar amount without loss of generality).
As shown in Figure 1, which depicts the model graphically, before reform, if the rm provides
health insurance, labor demand is lower by b.8 After reform, if the rm does not provide health
insurance, labor demand shifts down by the per-worker penalty for not complying with the employer
mandate.
Figure 1: Graphical Model
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Next consider labor supply. A representative individual chooses how many hours to work to
maximize utility, resulting in the following labor supply function:
LtS = L
ESHI,t
S (w + αb+ λtb− µxtb)ESHIt + L
NoESHI,t
S (w)(1− ESHIt).
Willingness to supply hours of work L in period t is a function LESHI,tS or L
NoESHI,t
S of the hourly
wage w. For an individual with ESHI, given by the indicator ESHIt, which is exogenous for now,
labor supply is also a function of the cost to the employer for a standard health insurance benet
b, scaled by the amount that an individual values a dollar of ESHI relative to a dollar of wages, α,
and policy parameters in place at time t: the individual penalty for not having health insurance λt,
that we observe in multiple periods.
8As depicted, LESHI,tD and L
NoESHI,t
D have the same linear functional form (the linear functional form is an
approximation to a general nonlinear functional form).
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and the subsidy µxt available on the individual health insurance market, which varies in generosity
based on income group x. The individual mandate and the subsidies are not in place before reform,
implying, ρBefore = λBefore=µx,Before = 0, but they are in place after reform, implying λAfter=λ,
and µx,After = µx.
Before the reform, Figure 1 shows that if an individual moves from not having ESHI to having
ESHI, labor supply shifts downward by αb because the individual is willing to work for lower wages
in a job that provides ESHI. This shift results because ESHI is not merely a cost to the employer;
it also has value to the employee. In the individual's choice problem, several factors can aect
the magnitude of the underlying valuation of ESHI relative to a dollar of wages: α. For example,
canonical insurance theory demonstrates that willingness to pay for insurance is determined by an
individual's wealth, health risk, risk preferences, and the available insurance contract (see, e.g.,
Arrow [1963] and Rothschild and Stiglitz [1976]). Furthermore, there is a tax preference for ESHI,
so we expect the tax preference to increase α as a function of the individual's marginal tax rate.
Rather than modeling these factors individually, we model only α, which we will demonstrate to be
a sucient statistic for welfare analysis in the spirit of Chetty (2009).
After the reform, labor supply also reects the penalty associated with the individual mandate
and any subsidy available to that individual for health insurance outside of employment. That is,
the individual penalty augments the individual's underlying valuation of ESHI, shifting his labor
supply curve further downward for jobs oering ESHIeven if the individual does not value health
insurance on its own merits, he will value it at least as much as the penalty that he must pay
for not having it.9 A subsidy available outside of employment also aects the individual's labor
supply if he obtains health insurance through his employer because the outside coverage option has
changed. He is more willing to work for ESHI instead of wages in the face of a penalty, and he is
less willing to work for ESHI instead of wages in the face of a subsidy for health insurance outside
of employment. After the reform, if the individual moves from not having ESHI to having ESHI,
his labor supply shifts downward by α + λ − µx, which we call the penalty-and-subsidy-inclusive
valuation of ESHI, multiplied by the cost of health insurance b. The penalty-and-subsidy-inclusive
9We do not expect the individual penalty to increase the total valuation of health insurance for an individual who
already values it fully. Therefore, we specify that the magnitude of λ is aected by the underlying valuation α and
the statutory penalty Λ as follows:
λ =

Λ, for α ≤ 1 − Λ
1 − α, for 1 − Λ ≤ α ≤ 1
0, for α > 1
In the rst case, α is small, so λ takes on its statutory value, and the penalty-inclusive valuation, which we dene as
α+ λ, is less than 1. In the second case, λ is large enough to augment α until the penalty-inclusive valuation is full.
In the third case, the individual's underlying valuation of health insurance is higher than the cost to the employer.
Such a case could arise if an individual cannot access health insurance outside of employment, perhaps because of
preexisting conditions that are excluded on the individual market. Such a case could also arise if health insurance
through the employer is cheaper than other insurance, which is likely because of the tax-preference for employer-
sponsored health insurance and because employers have more negotiating power than individuals. In this case, the
penalty-inclusive valuation of health insurance is his underlying valuation, and the penalty has no impact. We dene
the subsidy similarly so that it cannot reduce an individual's penalty-and-subsidy-inclusive valuation beyond zero.
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valuation incorporates underlying preferences for health insurance and the key policy features of
mandate-based reform in a simple measure: the shift in labor supply. We will show that the
penalty-and-subsidy-inclusive valuation is an important sucient statistic for our welfare analysis.
Putting the two sides of the market together yields a labor market equilibrium (w,L) in period
t that reects the underlying parameters that determine labor supply and demand. As shown in
Figure 1, there are two potential equilibria in each period t, conditional on whether the individual
receives health insurance through the employer: D and A are the equilibria for individuals with and
without ESHI before the reform, respectively; F and B are the equilibria for individuals with and
without ESHI after the reform, respectively.10 Our remaining theoretical and empirical analysis
relies on the distances between points A, B, D, and F . The remainder of this section focuses on
translating these distances into parameters of interest that ultimately allow us to analyze welfare.
2.2 Characterization of the Compensating Dierential for ESHI
We begin by demonstrating how the model allows us to identify the compensating dierential for
health insurance, dened as the causal dierence in wages between jobs with ESHI and jobs without
ESHI. We can also characterize the corresponding hours dierential using hours in lieu of wages. To
obtain compensating and hours dierentials, we simply compare wages and hours in the equilibria
with ESHI (equilibria D and F ) to wages and hours in the equilibria without ESHI (equilibria A and
B). The rst column of Table 1 shows the four possible comparisons of equilibrium wages and hours
that we can use to measure compensating and hours dierentials. As shown in Figure 1, because
health reform shifts labor supply and labor demand, the compensating and hours dierentials are
dierent depending on which equilibria we compare.
Table 1: Compensating and Hours Dierentials
Compensating Differential Sufficient Statistics Coefficients
wD − wA s−αdd−s b β8 [ + β8e ]
wF − wB (1−ρ)s−(α+λ−µx)dd−s b β1 + β8 [ + β1e + β8e ]
wD − wB (1−ρ)s−αdd−s b β8 − β11 [ + β8e ]
wF − wA s−[α+λ−µx]dd−s b β1 + β8 + β11 [ + β1e + β8e ]
Hours Differential Sufficient Statistics Coefficients
LD − LA 1−αd−s b γ8 [ + γ8e ]
LF − LB 1−ρ−(α+λ−µx)d−s b γ1 + γ8 [ + γ1e + γ8e ]
LD − LB 1−ρ−αd−s b γ8 − γ11 [ + γ8e ]
LF − LA 1−(α+λ−µx)d−s b γ1 + γ8 + γ11 [ + γ1e + γ8e ]
10The Summers model is a special case of our model with a single potential equilibrium in each period and a dierent
policy intervention. In the Summers model, before the policy intervention, there is only one equilibrium at Ano
jobs include ESHI. The policy intervention consists of a mandate that all employers must provide health insurance,
and it is not a pay-or-play mandate, so there is full compliance with the mandate. After the policy intervention,
there is only one equilibrium at Dall jobs include ESHI.
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We can also use the compensating and hours dierentials to learn about the valuation of ESHI
and the other model parameters. In the second column of Table 1, we express each compensating or
hours dierential in terms of the sucient statistics of the model. These expressions follow directly
from the geometry of Figure 1. We represent the slope of the labor supply curve with s and the
slope of the labor demand curve with d (these slopes are elasticities if we specify w as the logarithm
of wages and h as the logarithm of hours).
In our empirical implementation, we will be particularly interested in the compensating and
hours dierentials for individuals who switch from not having ESHI before the reform (equilibrium
A) to having it after the reform (equilibrium F ). For these individuals, as shown in the expression
in the last row of the each panel of Table 1, if the penalty-and-subsidy-inclusive valuation is full
(α + λ − µx = 1), then the absolute value of the compensating dierential is equal to the cost of
ESHI (ESHI decreases wages by b), and the hours dierential is zero (ESHI does not distort hours
worked). Therefore, if the compensating dierential is equal to the cost of the benet and the hours
dierential is zero, then we can infer that the penalty-and-subsidy-inclusive valuation is full.11
2.3 Characterization of the Welfare Impact of Health Reform Using Sucient Statis-
tics
To this point, we have developed a simple model that allows us to express all of the key parameters
of mandate-based reform as well as the set of preferences that determine an individual's valuation
of ESHI in terms of labor market equilibria. We are also interested in how the Massachusetts
and national mandate-based reform aect welfare and how these policies compare to alternative
approaches that could be taken to expand health insurance coverage. Our model allows us to
conduct welfare analysis simply with sucient statistics, building on our estimated compensating
dierential.
Mandate-based policy can reduce welfare if it distorts the labor market such that workers are
willing to work for wages lower than the market wage and employers are willing to hire workers
for more than the market wage, but the transaction does not occur. Graphically, the welfare
reduction corresponds to a weighted combination of two overlapping triangles shown in Figure 2.
The deadweight loss is the triangle given by F ′AF ′′ if the representative individual has ESHI after
the reform, and it is equal to the triangle given by B′AB if he does not.12 We can also express
these triangles in terms of the key parameters of the model. The combined deadweight loss of the
11Previous studies based on the Summers model have stopped at related inferences because they only have enough
variation to identify the valuation if it is full. If the compensating dierential is less than the cost of the benet, and
the hours dierential is nonzero, then they cannot infer the magnitude of the penalty-and-subsidy-inclusive valuation
beyond stating that it is not full. However, as we discuss in Section 3, the additional sources of variation in our
model enrich the empirical content of the Summers model, allowing us to identify the penalty-and-subsidy-inclusive
valuation, regardless of the true magnitude.
12As shown, the deadweight loss for individuals with ESHI is smaller, but the relative magnitudes of the triangles
can reverse, depending on the magnitudes of the policy parameters.
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Figure 2: Graphical Model with Deadweight Loss
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((1− (α+ λ− µx))2ESHIAfter + ρ2(1− ESHIAfter)). (1)
If we know the values for all of the terms in this equation, we can calculate the welfare impact of
mandate-based health reform on the labor market. Thus, these terms are sucient statistics for
welfare analysis. For example, if the employer penalty is equal to zero and the penalty-and-subsidy-
inclusive valuation is full (α+ λ− µx = 1), then there is no deadweight loss associated with health
reform.
While the welfare impact of mandate-based reform is clearly of interest, we are also interested
in comparing mandate-based policy to potential counterfactual approaches that could be used to
expand health insurance coverage. Using Equation (1), we can compare the deadweight loss of
mandate-based reform to the deadweight loss of alternative policies. If we can express the key
policy elements in terms of labor market equilibria, than we can compare dierent policies simply
by taking the ratio of the deadweight losses.
We focus on comparison of the deadweight loss from mandate-based reform to the deadweight
loss from a tax-based reform that relies on a wage tax to nance a single payer or Medicare for all"
program. To compare these policy options, we begin by computing the deadweight loss of a tax.
Suppose that before the tax-based reform, there are no penalties or subsidies. No employers provide
health insurance to their employees, such that the initial labor market equilibrium is at point A.
Now suppose that the government levies a tax τ on employers to provide health insurance (the
incidence is the same if the government instead levies the tax on employees). Suppose for now that
the tax is equal to the cost of providing a standard health insurance benet b. As shown in Figure
11
1, labor demand shifts downward by b, and holding labor supply constant, the new labor market
equilibrium is at point T . Following Summers (1989), the key assumption about tax-based reform
is that it does not induce a shift in labor supply. An equivalent way of stating this assumption is
that workers place no value on the health insurance that they receive through tax-based reform.13





Taking the ratio of the deadweight loss of mandate-based reform to the deadweight loss of tax-based






((1− (α+ λ− µx))2ESHIAfter + ρ2(1− ESHIAfter)). (2)
This equation characterizes the welfare of the combined features of mandate-based reform relative to
a tax-based reform in terms of a small number of sucient statistics: the cost b that employers pay
for ESHI compared to the necessary tax revenue τ for the same benet; the penalty-and-subsidy-
inclusive valuation, α + λ − µx, for individuals who have ESHI after reform; the employer penalty
ρ for individuals who do not have ESHI after reform; and the fraction of individuals with ESHI
after reform, ESHIAfter. Since the same individuals would be covered by both mandate-based and
tax-based reform, underlying health risk is invariant to the plan. Thus the ratio of b to τ is just
the relative loading cost of ESHI and government-provided health insurance. We show in Section
3.3 that two of the key sucient statisticsthe cost of the benet b and the penalty-and-subsidy-
inclusive valuation α+λ−µxare functions of the compensating and hours dierentials from before
to after the reform.
To demonstrate our theoretical contribution, it is useful to replicate the basic ndings from
the Summers model, a special case of our model. We can capture the ratio of the full-compliance
mandate in the Summers model to a tax using Equation (2) with no penalties or subsidies (λ = µx =
0), all agents in ESHI after reform (ESHIAfter = 1), and a tax equal to the cost of health insurance
to employers(τ = b). In this simplied case, for any value of α > 0, the relative deadweight loss
of mandate-based reform is less than it would be under a tax.14 Intuitively, taxes distort the labor
market. The distortion to the labor market can be smaller under a mandate if individuals value
the ESHI that they receive and are therefore willing to work for lower wages. This special case
yields the theoretical contribution of Summers (1989): an employer mandate reduces deadweight
13In comparing mandate-based policy to tax-based policy, we follow Summers (1989) in assuming that tax-based
policy makes the link between taxes and benets less salientworkers can recognize the link between ESHI and
wages under mandate-based health reform, but they do not recognize the link between tax-nanced health insurance
and the tax they pay on wages under tax-based reform. If the link is just as strong under both policies, then the
welfare impact of both reforms would be the same. Thus, our empirical estimates capture the potential eciency
gains that come either from linking benets to wage reductions or to a tax. While often discussed, this linkage is
hard to measure empirically, but our setting allows us to measure this linkage directly.
14We can represent the deadweight loss of the full-compliance mandate with a single triangle, D′AD′′, which is
smaller than the triangle associated with a tax if α > 0.
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loss relative to a tax.
However, our model demonstrates that an employer mandate does not always reduce deadweight
loss relative to a tax. If there is already a pay-or-play individual mandate in place, the addition
of a full-compliance or a pay-or-play employer mandate weakly decreases welfare relative to a tax.
Consider the case where there is already an individual pay-or-play mandate in place, but there is no
employer penalty. The deadweight loss relative to a tax is given by Equation (2) with µx = ρ = 0.
If there is no employer penalty, there is no distortion if the individual does not have ESHI. Adding a
full-compliance employer mandate weakly increases the deadweight loss ratio because the individual
must have ESHI and the associated distortion; zero distortion without ESHI is no longer possible.
Likewise, adding a pay-or-play mandate weakly increases the deadweight loss ratio because the
individual now has a distortion associated with a positive ρ if he does not have ESHI. Intuitively,
the individual mandate reduces deadweight loss because it makes individuals willing to work for
lower wages if they receive ESHI. When the individual mandate is already in place, the employer
mandate results in additional deadweight loss for individuals without ESHI.
Another related implication of our welfare analysis is that as long as some individuals receive
ESHI from their employers, the addition of a pay-or-play individual mandate can reduce deadweight
loss in the labor market. Algebraically, an increase in λ in Equation (1) results in decreased dead-
weight loss. This implication seems counterintuitive if we expect that additional policies generally
result in additional distortions.15
3 Identifying and Estimating the Model
In this section, we develop the empirical analog of our theoretical model. We have shown that we can
express the compensating dierential for ESHI and the welfare impact of health reform in terms of
dierences between the four labor market equilibria. Thus, to estimate the model we must identify
wages and hours at each equilibrium. To do so, we rely on the variation induced by the reform in
Massachusetts. The simplest approach would require only eight pieces of data to estimate the four
labor market equilibria in Figure 1: average wages and hours for jobs with and without ESHI before
and after reform within Massachusetts. We could then calculate the compensating dierential for
ESHI and the sucient statistics for the welfare impact of health reform. However, we need to
incorporate additional sources of variation to account for factors outside of the model that would
bias our estimates were we to merely compare means in Massachusetts over time across groups.
Nevertheless, the basic idea that underlies our entire empirical approach is based on comparing
these four equilibria; the additional dierences are merely to better identify them.
15We do note, however, that the addition of an individual mandate can increase distortion in the market for goods
and services by requiring individuals to allocate more dollars to health insurance and fewer dollars to other goods.
However, we focus on distortions to the labor market, assuming that the government has already decided to expand
health insurance coverageas in the case of the Massachusetts reform and the ACAand is looking for the most
ecient way to do so. For a given level of coverage, distortions to the market for goods and services are the same
under mandate-based reform and tax-based reform. By taking the ratio of the distortion under mandate-based reform
to the distortion under tax-based reform, we can focus on the welfare impact of health reform on the labor market.
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3.1 The Estimating Equation
To estimate all of the relevant dierences between labor market equilibria, the compensating and
hours dierentials and the welfare impact of health reform, we specify and estimate wage and hours
equations of the following form:
Yit =[β1(MA ∗ ESHI ∗After ∗ Large)it + β8(MA ∗ ESHI ∗ Large)it + β11(MA ∗After ∗ Large)it +
β12(ESHI ∗After ∗ Large)it + β19(ESHI ∗ Large)it + β22(After ∗ Large)it +
β23(Large)it + (φs ∗ Large)it + ]
β1[e](MA ∗ ESHI ∗After)it + β8[e](MA ∗ ESHI)it + β11[e](MA ∗After)it +
β12[e](ESHI ∗After)it + β19[e](ESHI)it + β22[e](After)it + φs + δi + εit, (3)
where Yit measures wages w or hours L for individual i in state s at time t. We specify wages
and hours in levels. The level specication allows us to capture the impact of the reform on the
intensive margin of how many hours to work and the extensive margin of whether to work because
we can include unemployed workers in the sample, specifying that they have wages and hours of
zero. The level specication also allows health insurance to have a realistic additive rather than
multiplicative eect on wages, but we also investigate robustness to specifying wages and hours
in logarithmic form. MA is an indicator for the state of Massachusetts relative to other states,
ESHI is an indicator for ESHI relative to the absence of ESHI, After is an indicator for the period
after the reform relative to the period before the reform, and Large is an indicator for large rms
relative to rms of known small size that are exempt from the employer mandate. We represent the
coecients of the wage equation with subscripted β coecients, and we represent the corresponding
coecients of the hours equation with subscripted γ coecients. The numbers of the coecients
convey that they are a subset of the coecients of the full equation that we use to separately identify
dierent values of µx, which we present in the Online Appendix.
16 We include state xed eects
φs with a state other than Massachusetts omitted to control for dierences in wages across states,
and we include individual xed eects δi to control for time-invariant dierences across individuals,
allowing for individual-specic shocks at time t, εit. We include a time xed eect, After, to control
for changes in the labor market over time.17 We begin with a baseline specication that excludes
all bracketed terms. This specication excludes variation between large and small (exempt) rms.
We subsequently include the bracketed terms in our full specication.
Our approach incorporates three key sources of variation in addition to the changes in Mas-
sachusetts over time in labor market outcomes by ESHI status. First, we rely on variation within
individuals over time by including individual xed eects. The individual xed eects are essential
because they allow us to control for a myriad of worker characteristics that shift labor supply and
demand for a given individual for reasons that are correlated with having ESHI. That is, individuals
16The Online Appendix for this paper is available at http://www.econ.yale.edu/~ak669/malabor.
onlineappendix.latest.draft.pdf.
17In all specications, we also allow for a during implementation period that is separate from the before and after
periods. In our results tables, we represent the coecients on during period terms with corresponding d superscripts.
14
who have ESHI are likely to dier from those individuals who do not, and those dierences are also
manifest in labor market outcomes. Unobserved dierences between individuals with and without
ESHI is the standard concern that has plagued the literature on the compensating dierential for
health insurance. A more subtle but critical reason to incorporate individual xed eects is the need
to address compositional change among those with ESHI in Massachusetts from before to after the
reform. If mandate-based reform dierentially increases ESHI rates among individuals with lower
wages and/or work hours, without individual xed eects, we could spuriously estimate a negative
relationship between ESHI and wages after the reform.
Second, we incorporate variation between Massachusetts and other states to control for factors
that shift labor supply and demand nationally for reasons that are unrelated to Massachusetts health
reform. Incorporating this variation allows us to control for any aggregate trends in the relationship
between ESHI and labor market outcomes.
Finally, in our full specication, we incorporate variation between small and large rms.18 This
additional source of variation allows us to better identify the impact of the employer penalty by
comparing rms that qualied relative to rms that were exempt. In contrast, because it does not
include variation by rm size, our baseline specication assumes that all Massachusetts rms are
subject to the employer penalty after reform. Incorporating variation by rm size also helps to
control for Massachusetts-specic factors unrelated to health reform that could shift labor supply
and demand.19
Our estimating equations are relatively straightforward, allowing us to estimate them with ordi-
nary least squares. The simplicity of the estimating equations is an advantage of our model relative
to alternative structural models because robustness analysis is easier to implement, and the results
are more transparent. Furthermore, because the functional form of these equations is relatively
simple, we can interpret the coecients directly as well as the combinations of coecients that
make up the sucient statistics.
3.2 Estimating Wages, Hours, and the Compensating Dierential for ESHI
To identify the wage and hours associated with dierent equilibria, we focus on the linear combi-
nations of coecients that correspond to wage and hours at each equilibrium A, B, D and F , as
opposed to focusing on a single coecient as in a traditional dierence-in-dierences model. To
see the distinction between our estimating equation and a dierence-in-dierences model, consider
18We recognize that rm size can be endogenous in the sense that individuals can choose to work at small or large
rms in response to health reform or rms that are near the rm size cuto may endogenously change their size to
avoid penalties. However, we want to allow for such behavior to capture the broadest possible impact of reform.
If individuals do switch rm size based on their valuation of ESHI, then our results might not be representative of
the entire population. However, we are especially interested in the valuation of those individuals aected by reform.
Furthermore, the individuals aected by reform in Massachusetts are likely to be similar to the individuals aected
by the ACA.
19We extend the model to incorporate variation in subsidy amounts and discuss the associated results in the Online
Appendix. This variation allows us to identify separate equilibria for individuals for dierent subsidy amounts. With
these equilibria, we can separately identify λ from µx, and we can identify a dierent value of µx for each income
eligibility group x. However, because using this variation requires us to divide the data into small groups based on
income eligibility thresholds, we do not use this variation in our full specication.
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that in the baseline specication that omits bracketed terms, the rst coecient β1 is the tradi-
tional dierence-in-dierence-in-dierences coecient. It gives the impact on wages for individuals
in Massachusetts relative to individuals in other states, when they have ESHI relative to when they
do not have ESHI, after the reform relative to before the reform. In this specication, individu-
als in Massachusetts with ESHI after reform are the only group treated by reform, and all other
individuals are in control groups. However, our model predicts that individuals in Massachusetts
without ESHI after reform have also been treated by the reformtheir wages and hours should be
lower because of the employer penaltyso we do not want to use them as a control group in our
preferred estimate of the compensating dierential. Similarly, our full specication that includes
bracketed terms resembles a dierence-in-dierences specication, but we do not want to examine
only the resulting β1 coecient because doing so would incorporate control groups that should not
be incorporated according to our model.20
Accounting for dierences with relevant control groups, we express the wages associated with
each equilibrium in Table 2. The hours associated with each equilibrium are equivalent with γ
in place of β. To ease interpretation, we normalize wA = 0 and LA = 0 so that all equilibria
are relative to the equilibrium without ESHI before reform. The derivation of these expressions is
straightforward. For example, the dierence in wages between equilibrium B and A (the equilibrium
without ESHI after the reform relative to the equilibrium without ESHI before the reform) is
β11, the change in wages from after the reform to before the reform for individuals who remain
without ESHI in Massachusetts, relative to individuals in other states who remain without ESHI.
In the full specication, which includes the bracketed terms in Equation (3), β11 also reects the
dierence between individuals in large rms and individuals in small exempt rms, thus controlling
for Massachusetts-specic factors after reform.
Table 2: Wages in Terms of Coecients
wA NoESHI, Before 0
wB NoESHI, After β11
wD ESHI, Before β8 [ +β8e ]
wF ESHI, After β1 + β8 + β11 [ +β1e + β8e ]
Using the expressions for the labor market equilibria in Table 2, we can then express the com-
pensating and hours dierentials in terms of regression coecients in the last column of Table 1.
Our preferred measure of the compensating dierential, wF −wA, is the sum of several coecients:
β1 + β8 + β11 [ +β1e + β8e]. These coecients reect the change in wages observed for individuals
who switch from not having ESHI before the reform to having it after the reform, relative to individ-
uals who have the same switch in ESHI status from before to after reform in other states. Because
20As in the baseline specication, we do not want to include individuals in Massachusetts without ESHI after reform
as a control group because they are treated by the employer penalty. Even more importantly, we do not want to
include individuals in small rms as controls for individuals in large rms in all instances because our model predicts
that individuals at rms of both sizes should experience declines in wages when they shift into ESHI. Only individuals
in small rms without ESHI are a valid control group because they are not subject to the employer penalty.
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the most convincing identication comes from changes in ESHI status for a given individual induced
by the reform, we focus on this comparison for our preferred estimates of the compensating and
hours dierentials. In contrast, the rst two dierentials in Table 1 rely on changes in ESHI status
for a given individual within the period either before or after reform. The changes in ESHI status
that identify these compensating dierentials could be endogenous, even after including individual
xed eects, if individuals gain ESHI when they get a better job that includes health insurance.
3.3 Estimating Sucient Statistics and the Welfare Impact of Mandate-Based Health
Reform
To estimate the welfare impact of health reform given in Equations (1) and (2), we rst estimate
the underlying sucient statistics. We can express most of the sucient statistics in terms of
dierences in wages and hours between the four labor market equilibria depicted in Figure 1. Our
derivation follows directly from the geometry of the gure. For example, we compute the slope of
the labor supply curve by comparing equilibrium A to equilibrium B, two points on the same labor
supply curve. Similarly, we compute the slope of the labor demand curve by comparing equilibrium
D to equilibrium F . In the rst two rows of Table 3, we express the supply and demand curve
slopes in terms of wages and hours dierences between equilibria. The last column gives equivalent
expressions in terms of coecients. In the subsequent rows of the table, we express other sucient
statistics in terms of the slope of the labor supply and demand curves as well as dierences between
other equilibria.
Table 3: Sucient Statistics





















α + λ− µx s(LF−LA)−(wF−wA)b
s(γ1+γ8+γ11 [+γ1e+γ8e])−(β1+β8+β11 [+β1e+β8e])
b
As discussed above, the dierences between labor market equilibria that are identied by changes
resulting from the Massachusetts reform are arguably best identied. Therefore, some sucient
statistics are identied more convincingly than others. Fortunately, these sucient statistics are
the most important for welfare analysis: the penalty-and-subsidy-inclusive valuation (α+λ−µx) and
the cost of ESHI to employers (b). From Table 3, we see that we identify both using individuals who
transition from not having ESHI before the reform to having ESHI after the reform (equilibrium A to
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equilibrium F ) and values for d and s. Intuitively, we can recover the penalty-and-subsidy-inclusive
valuation of ESHI by examining changes in wages and hours for an individual who transitions
from the equilibrium without ESHI before reform to the equilibrium with ESHI after reform and
vice versa. The dierences between these two equilibria are our best-identied measures of the
compensating and hours dierentials. Therefore, the penalty-and-subsidy-inclusive valuation and
the cost of the benet will be the best-identied sucient statistics.
The other sucient statistics are identied in principle, but not as convincingly because they
do not depend on changes in ESHI status induced by the reform.21 In practice, we estimate values
for these parameters that do not accord well with values that we expect based on the literature and
the empirical magnitude of the employer penalty. Given that these parameters are not identied by
the Massachusetts reform and that their misspecication can aect the estimates of all the other
sucient statistics through the s and d terms in their derivations, we discard the empirical estimates
and calibrate them. Reviewing the literature suggests that reasonable magnitudes for labor supply
and demand elasticities are 0.1 and −0.2, respectively (Blundell and MaCurdy 1999, Hamermesh
1996). Because our specication is in levels (not logarithms), we convert these into slopes at the
mean wage and hours. We also calibrate the employer penalty ρ such that the dollar value of the
employer penalty ρb is equal to the statutory penalty of $295 per year.
We estimate the welfare impact of health reform by plugging the estimated sucient statistics
along with calibrated values into Equations (1) and (2) with these sucient statistics and two others:
a value for ESHIAfter, which we estimate as the probability of having ESHI in Massachusetts after
reform in our data, and a ratio of b to t, which we calibrate initially as 1 before examining robustness
to lower loading costs for health insurance provided through tax-based reform. Given that we
calibrate some sucient statistics, one might be tempted to calibrate most of our model using the
statutory values of the policy parameters, rather than estimating any sucient statistics. However,
it is important to estimate the sucient statistics for two main reasons. First, the individual's
underlying valuation α does not have a statutory value. Second, the behavioral response to the policy
parameters might be smaller or larger than the statutory policy parameters because of interactions
between them and the individual's underlying valuation (see Note 9), or if individuals over respond
21We can identify the slope of the demand curve d by comparing individuals with ESHI before and after the reform;
we can identify the slope of the supply curve s by comparing individuals without ESHI before and after the reform;
and we can also identify the employer penalty ρ by comparing individuals without ESHI before and after reform,
using a value for d. We can also identify α, λ, and µx separately from their sum, which would allow us to analyze the
welfare impact of the separate components of health reform independently. As shown in Table 3, identication of α
requires a value for s and the comparison of people with and without ESHI before reform. The inclusion of individual
xed eects should help to identify α because we control for time-invariant factors that aect wages and benets.
However, any changes over time that aect both simultaneously will lead to bias. For example, if an individual
without health insurance gets promoted to a job with higher wages and ESHI, we will estimate a negative value
for α, even if the individual values the benet such that the true value of α is positive. Such bias is precisely the
problem that has hindered previous eorts to identify compensating dierentials, which we overcome in identifying
the penalty-and-subsidy-inclusive valuation but not in identifying α separately. We can also attempt to separately
identify λ and µx. As shown in Table 3, identication of the dierence λ−µx requires a value for s and the comparison
of people with ESHI before and after reform. To separately identify µx from λ, and to identify dierent values of
µx for people eligible for dierent subsidy amounts, we can incorporate variation in subsidy amounts across income
eligibility thresholds as we discuss in the Online Appendix.
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if they are averse to paying penalties on moral grounds.22 Therefore, we only calibrate values when
we have reason to believe that identication is not convincing and the empirical results are not
consistent with the model.
4 Data and Summary Statistics
4.1 The Survey of Income and Program Participation
For our main analysis, we use the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), a nationally
representative longitudinal survey covering households in the civilian noninstitutionalized popu-
lation. As we discuss in detail, the longitudinal nature of the SIPP is critical for identication.
Individuals selected into the SIPP sample are interviewed once every four months over a four-year
panel. Each interview covers information about the previous four-month period, resulting in person-
month-level data. Interview months dier across individuals in the sample. Previous research has
shown evidence of seam bias" in the SIPP, whereby individuals tend to give the same responses
during one interview for all four months associated with the interview period, but they do change
responses from one interview to the next (see Chetty [2008]). To address seam bias, we restrict
our data to the interview month in our regression specications. We use weights in all summary
statistics and regressions to account for the SIPP sampling and response unit design.23
We use the full 2004 SIPP panel, which covers October 2003 to December 2007. A potential
limitation of this SIPP panel is that it does not extend for a long time after reform was fully
implemented, and it will not be extended further because an entirely new SIPP cohort began in
2008. Despite this potential limitation, we believe the SIPP data are the best-suited to modeling
the labor market impact of the Massachusetts reform for a number of reasons.
First and foremost, the SIPP is the largest longitudinal data set that we are aware of that
includes labor market outcomes and insurance information. The Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
(MEPS) is longitudinal, but it only extends for two and a half years, and the sample size is only
approximately 15 percent of the size of the SIPP, with 160 individuals in Massachusetts.24 The
22The CBO considered a behavioral response to an individual mandate in their estimates of the impact of the ACA
on coverage (Auerbach et al. 2010). They highlight the need to understand responses to the individual mandate in
more detail, and our methodology could prove useful.
23We use data from the core content of the SIPP. We construct our data by appending the 12 individual-wave les
from the 2004 panel and merging longitudinal weights onto the full le by individual person identiers. Longitudinal
panel weights account for people who were in the sample in wave 1 of the panel and for whom data were obtained
(either reported or imputed) for every month of the panel. There are four panel weights associated with the 2004
SIPP panel; the rst covers people present in waves 14, the second covers people in waves 17, the third covers
people in waves 110, and the fourth covers people who have data for the whole sample (waves 112). The panel
weighting scheme does not assign weights to people who enter the sample universe after wave 1 (panel weight = 0
if the individual was not in the sample in wave 1, if they have missing data for one or more month(s), or both).
In choosing the appropriate weights, there is a trade-o between length of individual data and reductions in sample
size associated with attrition. Our specication does not use panel weights and instead uses individual weights,
therefore maximizing the number of respondents. In results not reported, we reestimate our regressions using each
panel weight. Reassuringly, the coecients of interest are relatively robust to these weight changes. Using weights 3
or 4 does lead to substantial loss of precision as the sample size falls when moving from longitudinal weight 1 to 4.
24We have run our regressions in the restricted-access MEPS with state identiers, but the sample size is not large
enough for us to obtain reliable results.
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Current Population Survey (CPS) and the American Community Survey (ACS) do not include
longitudinal identiers for health insurance. Although administrative data from Social Security are
longitudinal, they do not include information on hours worked or insurance.
Second, while we cannot compare wage and hours trends conditional on individual xed eects
across data sets because of data availability, raw wage and hours trends are very similar in the SIPP
to those in other data sets inside and outside of Massachusetts. We present these comparisons in
Appendix B.
Third, although we observe a relatively short period of responses after the individual mandate
went into eect on July 1, 2007, we also observe a full year of responses during the implementation
of the reform. Thus, we are able to observe the response in wages and hours of all individuals who
changed ESHI status in Massachusetts at any time after the reform was passed. This is particularly
valuable because open-enrollment periods for ESHI are generally in November, with new coverage
starting in January. Thus, to satisfy the individual mandate in July 2007 by taking up ESHI, many
individuals would have to start coverage in January 2007, well before our data end at the end of
December 2007.25 Using data from the CPS, we nd that of the eventual increase in coverage among
those 1864 in Massachusetts by 2010, 87 percent had occurred by the end of 2007 (measured in
the March 2008 CPS). The share of the eventual increase in those covered by ESHI by 2010 is
even higher at 91 percent, suggesting that our sample period covers the time in which much of the
expansion due to the reform had occurred despite our relatively short post-reform period.26
Despite all of the advantages of the 2004 SIPP panel, one limitation is that the sample size de-
creases over time, primarily because of interview reductions. Our group of interest is the population
between the ages of 18 and 64. In 2004, there are 72,057 unique individuals in this sample across
states, of which 2,047 unique individuals are in Massachusetts. In 2007, there are 28,661 unique
individuals in the sample, of which 685 unique individuals are in Massachusetts.
Using the SIPP, we construct our main dependent variables: hourly wages w and hours worked
per week L. We convert all wages into 2006 dollars using the Consumer Price Index for all urban
consumers (CPI-U) to adjust for ination. The SIPP allows respondents to report wages and hours
for up to two jobs, but our estimates rely on income and hours worked only in the primary job.
Because the SIPP data only include monthly income, not monthly wages, we must divide income by
a measure of hours worked to obtain monthly wages. However, because our model relies on separate
movements in w and L, it would be problematic for both measures to reect contemporaneous
movements in L. To get around this issue, which is related to the division bias problem in the labor
economics literature, we divide income by the average hours reported in the rst four interviews
25We also note that even if we had data beyond December 2007, we would be reticent to rely on it to estimate
our model because a recession began at that time. Dubay et al. (2012) present insurance coverage and employment
measures in Massachusetts, a set of northeastern control states, and the remainder of the country over time. They
show the impact of the recession in both Massachusetts and the various control groups beginning almost immediately
in 2008. With 2008 data, we would thus be concerned that the recession could have had a dierential impact on
Massachusetts relative to other states.
26We do, however, note that even though the CPS asks about coverage in the previous year, it is well known that
responses also reect current coverage. Thus, the responses from March of 2008 may reect some share of people
who gained coverage in 2008. Nevertheless, because the survey was very early in 2008, we would expect much of the
change in coverage to have occurred in our sample period in 2007.
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(representing a 16-month period). Our regression estimates are robust to alternative wage measures
because hours vary less than wages.
4.2 Summary Statistics
Before proceeding to our regression results, we assess the empirical validity of comparing Mas-
sachusetts to other states by comparing labor market, health insurance, and demographic variables.
From Appendix Figures B1 and B2, it is clear that aggregate labor market trends are similar in
Massachusetts and other states before reform across a variety of data sets. We also observe similar
aggregate labor market trends in Massachusetts and other states after reform, which is not surpris-
ing given our model. Our model predicts dierent movements in wages and hours based on ESHI
status before and after reform. The overall impact on the labor market, however, is ambiguous and
unlikely to be substantial unless a large share of the population changed ESHI status. As shown in
Figure 1, we expect individuals who switch from not having ESHI before the reform (equilibrium
A) to having ESHI after the reform (equilibrium F ) to receive weakly lower wages and to work
weakly lower hours. While these individuals are an important group from a policy perspective,
they are only a small fraction of the aggregate population in the labor market.27 We know from
prior research that, though the reform resulted in a signicant decline in the percentage of people
without health insurance, only approximately 6 percentage points of the population gained health
insurance coverage. Of those who gained coverage, roughly half gained ESHI and the other half
gained subsidized coverage (Kolstad and Kowalski 2012). Thus, it is unsurprising that the aggregate
measures of labor market changes do not reveal an impact of the reform.
We report summary statistics in Table 4. We compare the full population, the Massachusetts
population, and the non-Massachusetts population before reform and after reform. We exclude the
during-reform period here for simplicity. The rst row of the table shows our primary measure of w:
weekly earnings in 2006$ divided by baseline hours per week, including zero wages for individuals
without a paid job. Wages are higher in Massachusetts than they are in other states before and after
reform. Netting out the change in wages in other states from before to after reform, as shown in
the last column, hourly wages increased by $1.10 in Massachusetts after reform on a base of $17.90
before reform. This increase is statistically signicant. Excluding individuals without a paid job in
the second and third rows of the table, we see that wages increased by $0.05, 0.1 percent among the
employed, which is less than the wage increase that we see in the full sample, suggesting that part
of the wage increase we observe is driven by an increase in the number of people with paid jobs.
Indeed, the probability of reporting a paid job increased by 2.9 percentage points in Massachusetts
after reform on a base of 81.8 percent before reform.
27For individuals who continued to have ESHI (equilibrium D to equilibrium F ), our model predicts an ambiguous
change in hours and wages, depending on the relative magnitudes of the individual penalty λ and the subsidy µx.
For the small group of other individuals who switched from having ESHI before reform (equilibrium D) to not having
it after reform (equilibrium B) (perhaps because subsidies became available), the model also predicts an ambiguous
change in wages and hours, depending on the relative magnitudes of the underlying valuation α and the employer
penalty ρ. Therefore, while our model makes clear predictions about changes in wages and hours for individuals based
on changes in ESHI status, the impact of reform on wages and hours in the aggregate labor market is an empirical
question.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics
Full Population MA Non-MA MA-Non-MA
Before After Before After Before After After-Before
w: Weekly earnings / baseline hours per week 13.998 14.189 17.895 19.164 13.909 14.077 1.101***
w|paid job & w>0 20.247 20.757 24.707 25.259 20.141 20.644 0.049
Log(w|paid job & w>0) 2.736 2.773 2.930 2.973 2.732 2.768 0.007
L: Hours per week 29.237 28.803 30.257 31.053 29.214 28.752 1.258***
L|paid job & L>0 39.055 38.848 38.288 37.817 39.074 38.874 -0.271***
Log(L|paid job & L>0) 3.607 3.606 3.571 3.562 3.608 3.607 -0.008**
Hours per week in all jobs 39.896 39.471 39.452 38.313 39.906 39.499 -0.732***
Paid job 0.783 0.777 0.818 0.841 0.782 0.775 0.029***
Employed by Large Firm 0.853 0.845 0.854 0.825 0.853 0.845 -0.022***
Any Health Insurance 0.830 0.837 0.907 0.952 0.828 0.835 0.038***
ESHI 0.657 0.653 0.741 0.742 0.655 0.651 0.005
<150%FPL† 0.193 0.200 0.130 0.109 0.194 0.202 -0.028***
150-300%FPL† 0.283 0.288 0.207 0.171 0.285 0.291 -0.042***
Age 39.996 40.265 40.499 40.785 39.985 40.254 0.018
Married 0.561 0.552 0.545 0.499 0.562 0.554 -0.038***
Female 0.507 0.507 0.514 0.516 0.507 0.507 0.002*
†FPL category defined for each individual based on status in the Jan-June 2006 period.
2004 SIPP Panel.  Monthly weights used.
Full 18-64 population.  Only includes interview months.
Before: October 2003 - June 2006; After: July 2007 - December 2007.  Statistics are averages over the relevant period.
MA-Non-MA After-Before  is the coefficient on MA*After from a regression of the outcome on MA*After, MA, and After.
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1, block bootstrapped by state.
w and L measures include individuals without a paid job with w=0 or L=0, respectively, unless noted otherwise.
Results in the fourth row suggest that hours increased by 1.3 hours per week in our preferred
measure of L, which includes zero hours for individuals without a paid job. However, the increase
in hours appears to entirely reect an increase in employment. Among individuals with a paid job,
hours decreased by 0.27 hours per week on a base of 38.3 hours per week before reform, or by 0.8
percent in the logarithmic specication. The next row shows that by focusing on the rst job only
in our primary measure of L, we account for approximately 95 percent of hours in all jobs.
Taken together, these results suggest that Massachusetts experienced increased wages and in-
creased hours overall, with some of the increase in wages and all of the increase in hours operating
through increased employment. The increases in wages and hours that we observe are consistent
with our model, which predicts small but ambiguously signed impacts on the aggregate labor mar-
ket, given small numbers of individuals who switch ESHI status. We will need to use our regression
framework with individual xed eects to focus on those individuals who changed coverage due to
the reform, isolating the key empirical variation.
Individuals who changed ESHI status as a result of the reform are critical to our identication.
In the middle rows of Table 4, we compare insurance coverage in Massachusetts and other states.
Massachusetts has higher insurance coverage rates than other states; approximately 91 percent of
individuals between the ages of 18 and 64 in Massachusetts had some type of health insurance
before reform, increasing to 95 percent after reform. Outside of Massachusetts, health insurance
coverage stayed at at 83 percent. The simple dierence-in-dierences estimate for the increase in
coverage in Massachusetts due to the reform is 3.8 percentage pointsslightly lower but consistent
with existing estimates (Long 2008; Kolstad and Kowalski 2012; Yelowitz and Cannon 2010). We
also see an increase in the rate of ESHI coverage in Massachusetts of 0.5 percentage points; however,
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this increase is not statistically signicant.
Table 5 presents summary statistics for those switching ESHI status from before reform to after
reform in Massachusetts and control states. We see that those who switched ESHI status following
reform in Massachusetts had lower hourly wages, fewer working hours, and lower rates of employment
before reform than the average Massachusetts resident. The dierences between those who switched
ESHI status and the rest of the population are relatively small, but they underscore the need for us
to use individual xed eects in our regression specications to account for compositional change
in the population with ESHI. We also see that those switching ESHI status were slightly younger,
less likely to be married, and more likely to be male than the population that did not change ESHI
status. Finally, the bottom panel shows that those changing ESHI status were roughly equally likely
to change from a small to a large rm and vice versa from the period from before reform to after
reform. Their rate of rm size switching was also no higher than it was nationally, suggesting that
the population that identies our main results does not systematically move between rms based
on the applicability of the employer penalty.
Table 5: Summary Statistics for Individuals Changing ESHI Status in MA vs. Non-MA
All ESHI Switchers All ESHI Switchers
Unique Individuals observed Before and After Reform 23,239 4,030 626 87
w: Weekly earnings / baseline hours per week 14.040 8.487 18.175 9.151
w|paid job & w>0 20.370 15.440 24.877 16.488
Log(w|paid job & w>0) 2.746 2.457 2.936 2.531
L: Hours per week 29.129 23.319 30.643 22.120
L|paid job & L>0 39.008 36.737 38.366 33.162
Log(L|paid job & L>0) 3.607 3.526 3.571 3.344
Hours per week in all jobs 39.786 38.104 39.377 34.280
Paid job 0.781 0.700 0.824 0.709
Employed by Large Firm 0.851 0.825 0.849 0.794
Any Health Insurance 0.832 0.711 0.915 0.804
ESHI 0.656 0.357 0.736 0.314
<150%FPL† 0.197 0.311 0.134 0.311
150-300%FPL† 0.289 0.387 0.199 0.270
Age 40.088 37.556 40.467 38.548
Married 0.559 0.452 0.533 0.303
Female 0.507 0.515 0.513 0.502
FIRM SIZE CHANGES (before to after):
Large to small 0.056 0.145 0.065 0.201
Small to large 0.077 0.198 0.065 0.171
Notes:
All States MA
Sample includes 18-64 population, interview months only (4th-reference months).
ESHI switchers reports individuals who switched ESHI status between at least one inteview month before reform and at least one interview 
month after reform.
MA indicates in MA in at least one interview month.
5 Results and Discussion
5.1 Graphical Analysis
We begin by presenting a graphical version of our baseline specication that allows us to investigate
trends over time, after incorporating individual xed eects. To do so, we run a regression analogous
to our baseline (no bracketed terms) specication given by Equation (3), where the only change is
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that we replace every instance of After with a vector of all two-month periods in our data, omitting
only the last two-month period before reform (MayJune 2006).28

































































































































































In Figure 3, we plot the vector of coecients corresponding to β12 with the points connected
by the dashed line labeled ESHI. This line gives the wage premium for jobs with ESHI relative
to jobs without ESHI outside of Massachusettsthe empirical dierence in wages between jobs
with ESHI and jobs without ESHI. We also plot the vector of coecients corresponding to β1 with
the points connected by the solid line labeled MA ∗ ESHI. This line gives the dierential wage
premium for ESHI jobs relative to jobs without ESHI in Massachusetts relative to other states.
Because individual xed eects are included in the regressions, the coecients are identied by
people who change ESHI status in the given period relative to the omitted period outside and
inside of Massachusetts, respectively. We also show 95 percent condence intervals for both lines,
clustered by state. In Figure 4, we plot the corresponding γ coecients from a regression with hours
as the dependent variable.
Outside of Massachusetts, we see that the wage premium for ESHI jobs stays fairly constant over
time in Figure 3. Within Massachusetts before reform, the wage premium appears more variable,
likely given the smaller sample size. However, trends in the wage premium are broadly similar in
Massachusetts and in the other states before reform, lending support to our identication strategy.
Following the passage of reform in Massachusetts, we see a striking shift in the relationship
between ESHI and wages for individuals who switch ESHI status. There is a substantial drop in
28Because incorporating longitudinal variation through individual xed eects places greater demands on the data,
making the trend lines noisier, we combine each monthly response into mutually exclusive two-month periods, and
we use all months available in the data instead of just interview months in these gures only.
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the wage premium for ESHI jobs relative to jobs without ESHI during and after the reform in
Massachusetts relative to the period before the reform and relative to other states. We generally see
a drop in the wage premium during each of the two-month periods after MayJune 2006 except for
for the last two-month period, which shows a puzzling increase in both gures. The increase seems
to be due to sizable attrition from the sample in the last two months and not to a real increase in
the wage premium.29 Our regression specication, which pools all data within the before, during,
and after periods separately, places little weight on the visible uptick in the very last two-month
period because of the small sample size from which it is drawn.
The results in Figure 4 suggest that, while trends in the hours premium are somewhat noisy in
Massachusetts, they do not change dramatically in Massachusetts after the reform. The uptick that
we observe in the last period of observation appears to be due to sample attrition, as in Figure 3.
The overall small impact that we observe on the hours premium is consistent with the relatively
large observed decline in the wage premium; if wages for those with ESHI fell by roughly the full
the cost of ESHI to the employer, we would not expect a change in hours worked. The timing of
the shift in the wage premium coincides well with the reform.30
29If we examine the underlying data more closely, we see that there are approximately 3,000 observations (with
multiple observations for approximately 1,600 unique individuals) in Massachusetts in each two-month period before
reform, and approximately 1,000 observations (about 600 unique individuals) in Massachusetts in each two-month
period after reform, with the exception of the last two-month period, Nov to Dec 2007, in which there are only 400
observations (273 unique individuals).
30Chandra, Gruber, and McKnight (2011) examine enrollment in the individual health insurance market and nd
a spike in enrollment in December 2007. The decline in the wage premium that we observe begins before July 2007,
but it does not contradict their results because enrollment in ESHI to comply with the individual mandate would
have had to occur earlier than enrollment in the individual health insurance market to comply with the individual
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Although the regression results formalize the magnitude of the decline in the wage premium after
reform, we can learn something about the magnitude by examining Figures 3 and 4, keeping in mind
that the last point gets the smallest weight. We should also keep in mind that we expect wages for
jobs with and without ESHI to fall in Massachusetts after reform, and by analyzing coecients that
correspond to β1 only, we are assuming that there is no employer penalty. The true compensating
dierential that takes the employer penalty into account will be larger than the eects we observe.
In Figure 3, the magnitude of the decline in the wage premium for ESHI jobs in Massachusetts over
the entire period during and after reform appears to be approximately $1.5/hour, which corresponds
to a roughly 7.5 percent decline. These gures provide the rst evidence that the Massachusetts
reform aected jobs with ESHI, as we predict in our model. They also signal that we have found
an exogenous source of variation that will be useful in identifying a compensating dierential for
ESHI.
The shift that we observe in the relationship between ESHI and wages from before to after
reform in Massachusetts is particularly striking because it implies that individuals who switched into
ESHI from before to after reform experienced declines in real wages that were larger than ination,
indicating that they experienced declines in nominal wages. The labor economics literature shows
that it is very rare for workers who remain in the same job to accept declines in nominal wages.
Since these gures do not condition on remaining in the same job, some of the decline could be
due to workers who switch ESHI status at the same time that they switch jobs, and these workers
could accept lower monetary wages if they receive health insurance. Alternatively, workers could
have accepted lower nominal wages in the same job if the rm started providing health insurance.
Because the reform in Massachusetts aected the universe of employers, it is plausible that it
motivated compensation renegotiations, which allowed for nominal wage reductions. We know of
no data on this, so we cannot say much about the detail of the mechanism. We do, however, return
to these alternatives in a set of robustness checks that condition on remaining in the same job.
5.2 Regression Results
We report results from the baseline wage and hours equations in Table 6, and we begin our analysis
by examining the coecients directly. Recall that β1 gives the compensating dierential and γ1 gives
the hours dierential if we assume that there is no employer penalty such that individuals without
ESHI in Massachusetts after reform provide an additional control group for individuals with ESHI
in Massachusetts after reform. That is, we do not allow for variation by rm size that distinguishes
those who face the employer penalty in the group without ESHI. The estimated β1 tells us that
hourly wages are $0.85 lower for the same individuals when they have ESHI relative to when they
mandate. Although individuals were free to enroll in the the individual health insurance market at any timeallowing
them to carefully time enrollment to comply with the rules of the lawemployers generally conne enrollment in
ESHI to one particular open season, so individuals would need to enroll in ESHI earlier to satisfy the individual
mandate in July 2007. In our data, we cannot observe open seasons, and it is dicult to verify enrollment timing,
given issues with seam bias and reduced sample size after reform. Open enrollment frequently occurs on calendar or
scal years. In either case, to comply by July 1, 2007, one would have had to sign up for ESHI in December 2006 or
June 2007. Therefore, we would expect to see much of the impact of the reform prior to the precise implementation
of the mandate, in the latter portion of 2006 or the rst half of 2007.
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do not have ESHI, after the reform relative to before the reform, in Massachusetts relative to other
states. This coecient is statistically signicant at the 99 percent level. Annualizing the decrease
in hourly wages for a full-time worker, this coecient implies that the compensating dierential
for ESHI is −$1, 759.68 (= −0.846× 40× 52) per year. This compensating dierential is of the
expected sign, standing in contrast to much of the literature.
Table 6: Results from Baseline Specication
(1) (2)
w L
Weekly earnings / 
baseline hours per 
week, including 
individuals without a 
paid job (wage=0)
Hours per week, 
including individuals 
without a paid job 
(hours=0)
MA*ESHI*After -0.846*** -0.238
[-1.321, -0.277] [-0.917, 0.301]
MA*ESHI*During -0.745*** -1.743***
[-1.036, -0.346] [-2.201, -1.331]
MA*ESHI 1.128*** 1.053***
[0.717, 1.418] [0.404, 1.383]
MA*After 1.728*** 1.559***
[1.297, 1.993] [1.085, 2.028]
MA*During 1.191*** 2.433***
[0.856, 1.360] [2.092, 2.723]
ESHI*After -0.298 -0.611**
[-0.790, 0.170] [-0.942, -0.108]
ESHI*During -0.380** -0.494***
[-0.667, -0.098] [-0.695, -0.231]
ESHI 3.672*** 6.416***
[3.286, 3.872] [5.939, 6.703]
After 0.629*** 0.314
[0.226, 0.928] [-0.189, 0.721]
During 0.514*** 0.302**
[0.314, 0.722] [0.045, 0.517]
Observations 543,630 499,828
R-squared 0.738 0.805
Including full 18-64 population.
Only includes interview months.
Individual and state fixed effects included.  Monthly weights used.
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1, 95% confidence intervals reported; CIs block 
bootstrapped by state.
To get a sense of what we expect the magnitude of the compensating dierential for ESHI to
be, recall that the absolute value of the compensating dierential will be equal to the cost of ESHI
to employers b if the employer penalty ρ is equal to zero and the penalty-and-subsidy-inclusive
valuation α+λ−µx is full. Before estimating b using our model, we can compare the initial results
to an estimate from the Kaiser Family Foundation 2007 Survey of Employer Health Benets (Kaiser
Family Foundation 2007b). The average 2007 premium was $4,355 for an individual plan and $11,770
for a family plan (all amounts converted to 2006 dollars). The average employer contribution was 85
percent for an individual and 73 percent for a family plan. Using the share of the SIPP population
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with ESHI after reform who report having at least one child to calculate the share of family plans,
the weighted average annual cost of health insurance was $6,105. Alternatively, using the same
family denition and the share of the same SIPP population who switched from not having ESHI
in 2006 to having it after reform, the average annualized b was $5,576. Both are larger than $1,760
(the compensating dierential we estimate based on β1); however, the assumption that the employer
penalty is zero should bias our estimate toward zero. Therefore, we expect our full estimates will
be larger and more in line with actual costs of ESHI to employers.
In the second column of Table 6, our estimate of the hours dierential using γ1 tells us that
weekly hours are −0.238 lower for jobs with ESHI relative to jobs without ESHI in Massachusetts
relative to other states, after reform relative to before reform. Recall that if the penalty-and-subsidy-
inclusive valuation of the benet is full, the hours dierential will be zero. The estimated coecient
is not statistically dierent from zero, and the standard errors rule out large increases or decreases
in hours, consistent with a relatively high valuation of the benet.
To extend these results, we turn to estimating our full model that incorporates variation by
rm size. As we discussed in Section 3, this additional source of variation allows us to separately
estimate the employer penalty and to allow for changes in the Massachusetts labor market unrelated
to health reform. We also nd empirical support for the inclusion of this additional variation in our
full specication.31
5.3 Estimates of the Compensating Dierential for ESHI
To obtain estimates of the compensating dierential and hours dierential for ESHI, we estimate
our full specication with rm size interaction terms, and we report the results in Table 7. This
specication is more complicated than our baseline specication, so it is less intuitive to examine the
coecients directly. However, we can synthesize all of the relevant information in the coecients by
plotting the four empirical equilibria that map to the four theoretical equilibria presented in Figure
1. Figure 5 plots these empirical equilibria. All equilibria are relative to equilibrium A (no ESHI
before reform) at the origin.
The most important relationship to notice in Figure 5 is that equilibrium F (ESHI after reform)
is to the lower left of equilibrium A (no ESHI before reform), as predicted by our theory. The
relationship between A and F is the best identied relationship in the gure. The compensating
dierential for ESHI from Table 1 is the negative of the vertical distance between equilibrium A
and equilibrium F . As depicted in Figure 5, the third column of Table 7 shows that wF − wA
31If we do not assume that the employer penalty is zero, the compensating dierential from the baseline model
is given by β1 + β8 + β11 = −0.846 + 1.128 + 1.728 = 2.010, which is of the wrong theoretical sign. Recall from
Section 3.2 that if the employer penalty is small and there are no labor market changes in Massachusetts relative
to other states after reform, we expect β11 to be small relative to β1 and negative. Similarly, if our individual xed
eects allow us to identify the compensating dierential convincingly without using variation in ESHI induced by
reform, we expect β8 to be small and negative relative to β1. However, both are positive and of the same order
of magnitude as β1. Our estimated β11 suggests that something other than reform dierentially aected the labor
market in Massachusetts relative to other states (conrming our discussion of summary statistics), so we prefer the
specication that incorporates variation by rm size. Our estimated β8 suggests that we need variation in ESHI
induced by reform to estimate the compensating dierential for ESHI. For these reasons, we focus on estimates that
compare point A to equilibrium F incorporating variation by rm size in the full specication.
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Table 7: Results from Full Specication
(1) (2) (3)
w L
Weekly earnings / 
baseline hours per 
week, including 
individuals without a 
paid job (wage=0)
Hours per week, 
including individuals 





and Welfare Impact of 
Health Reform
MA*ESHI*After*Large -1.264* -0.593 1.193***
[-2.328, 0.00400] [-1.871, 0.425] [0.801, 1.482]
MA*ESHI*During*Large -1.535*** 0.433 0.136
[-2.485, -0.535] [-0.197, 1.125] [-0.409, 0.542]
MA*ESHI*Large 1.059*** -2.001*** 2.682***
[0.558, 1.515] [-2.819, -1.332] [1.987, 3.341]
MA*After*Large -1.488*** -1.142** -1.352***
[-2.156, -0.869] [-2.010, -0.233] [-2.447, -0.528]
MA*During*Large 1.107*** -0.768***
[0.318, 2.025] [-1.438, -0.223]
ESHI*After*Large 0.301 -0.0484 0.42
[-0.787, 1.249] [-1.083, 0.968] [-0.293, 0.811]
ESHI*During*Large 0.561 -0.414 0.185
[-0.322, 1.459] [-0.896, 0.114] [-0.939, 0.788]
ESHI*Large 1.844*** 7.212*** 1.563***
[1.365, 2.178] [6.580, 7.800] [0.341, 2.286]
After*Large -0.394 -0.688** -0.957**
[-1.029, 0.165] [-1.540, -0.00700] [-2.279, -0.115]
During*Large -0.413 -0.257
[-1.300, 0.119] [-0.837, 0.151]
Large -2.458*** -12.754** 0.190
[-4.593, -2.045] [-14.515, -11.061] -
MA*Large -2.136 3.124** -0.380
[-2.414, 0.183] [1.259, 5.140] -
MA*ESHI*After 0.207 0.358 0.083***
[-1.166, 1.497] [-0.584, 1.255] [0.046, 0.208]
MA*ESHI*During 0.607 -1.853*** 1.715***
[-0.323, 1.716] [-2.432, -1.211] [0.684, 3.059]
MA*ESHI 0.135 2.422*** -0.649***
[-0.442, 0.595] [1.664, 2.885] [-1.689, -0.306]
MA*After 2.895*** 2.247*** 1.331***
[2.152, 3.581] [1.489, 2.963] [0.905, 2.33]
MA*During 0.189 2.799*** 0.682***
[-0.689, 0.812] [2.182, 3.345] [0.405, 0.936]
ESHI*After -0.528 -0.512 0.740
[-1.728, 0.747] [-1.296, 0.297] -
ESHI*During -0.843** -0.149 1.000
[-1.829, -0.0150] [-0.559, 0.308] -
ESHI 2.193*** 0.589***
[1.682, 2.603] [0.135, 0.952]
After 0.925*** 0.829** 0.198***
[0.296, 1.546] [0.261, 1.487] [0.01, 1.1]
During 0.842*** 0.523*** 0.077***
[0.292, 1.632] [0.105, 1.046] [0.012, 0.265]
Observations 543,630 499,828
R-squared 0.739 0.815
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1, 95% confidence intervals reported; CIs block bootstrapped by state.
Including full 18-64 population.
Only includes interview months.
Individual and state fixed effects included.  Monthly weights used.
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Figure 5: Empirical Estimates of Wage and Hours Equilibria

























is equal to −$1.35 per hour. Annualizing the point estimate for a full-time worker, the implied
compensating dierential is −$2, 812 per year, which corresponds closely to the average cost of ESHI
to employers. This suggests that the magnitude of our estimate is in a plausible range and that the
penalty-and-subsidy-inclusive valuation is high. The annualized 95 percent condence interval on
the compensating dierential is −$5, 090 to −$1, 098 per year, obtained by block-bootstrapping by
state.32
We obtain our preferred estimate of the hours dierential for ESHI by taking the negative of the
horizontal distance between equilibrium A and equilibrium F . As depicted in Figure 5, the third
column of Table 7 shows that LF −LA is equal to −0.96 hours per week. While small in magnitude,
this estimate is statistically dierent from zero at the 5 percent level.
Another key relationship to notice is that equilibrium B (no ESHI after reform) is also to the
lower left of equilibrium A (no ESHI before reform), as predicted by our theory. However, the theory
also predicts that equilibrium B should have higher wages than equilibrium F when the penalty is
small (the hours comparison is ambiguous because it also depends on the magnitude of the penalty-
32To obtain all condence intervals, we perform a simple nonparametric block bootstrap. We rst draw a sample of
51 states with replacementthe data include all 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbiadrawing all observations
within a state as a block. We then estimate the wage and hours equations on the same sample, thus taking into
account that the same individuals are used to estimate the wage and hours equations. To include as much data as
possible, we drop observations with missing values of either outcome after selecting the replication sample, thereby
assuming that individuals with missing data have the same behavior as those without missing data. We repeat the
sampling process for 350 replications. For each quantity in column 3, we report the 0.025 quantile and the 0.975
quantile as our 95 percent condence interval. We report signicance when this condence interval or the analogous
90 percent or 99 percent condence interval does not include zero.
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and-subsidy-inclusive valuation), but empirically we see that equilibrium B has slightly lower wages
than equilibrium F , leading to a wrong-signed compensating dierential wF −wB. Recall, however,
that the relationship between equilibrium B and equilibrium A is not actually identied by changes
in ESHI status due to reform. Thus, while not ideal, we do not expect this dierence to be well
identied.
Finally, theory tells us that equilibrium D (ESHI after reform) should be to the lower left of
equilibrium A (no ESHI before reform), but the empirical equilibrium D is to the upper left of
equilibrium A. As shown in the third column of Table 7, the compensating and hours dierentials,
based on equilibrium D are wrong-signed. The observed relationship between equilibrium D and
equilibrium A is yet another manifestation of the well-known issue in the literature that it is dicult
to nd a correctly signed compensating dierential without exogenous variation in benets. The
estimate of D relative to A comes from individuals who switch into and out of ESHI before reform.
Because we cannot convincingly identify D, we are not able to separately identify the components
of the penalty-and-subsidy-inclusive valuation of health insurance, α and λ − µ. As shown in the
third column of Table 7, our separate estimates of these parameters are unreasonable. Although
these parameters would be interesting to analyze, we do not need to separately identify them to
identify the aggregate welfare impact of mandate-based health reform.
5.4 Estimates of the Welfare Impact of Health Reform
We next translate our preferred estimates of the compensating and hours dierentials into the
welfare impact of health reform. Up to this point, our results have come directly from the regression
coecients, and we have not made any calibrations. In theory, all of the sucient statistics for the
deadweight loss for health reform given by Equation (1) are identied. However, as we discuss
above, we have reason to believe that the identication for equilibrium B and equilibrium D is not
convincing, and plotting the empirical equilibria gives us further cause to doubt their identication.
For this reason, we rely only on the dierence between labor market equilibria that is identied by
variation due to the Massachusetts reform (equilibrium F relative to equilibrium A), and calibrate
other sucient statistics as necessary. Fortunately, using this variation, we can identify the key
policy-relevant sucient statistics: the cost of ESHI to employers (b) and the penalty-and-subsidy-
inclusive valuation (α + λ − µx). We can see from the expressions in Table 3 and the geometry of
Figure 5 that an estimate of the slope of the demand curve is sucient to translate the compensating
and hours dierentials into b, and an estimate of the slope of the supply curve is sucient to
translate the compensating and hours dierentials into α+ λ− µx. Using elasticity estimates from
the literature, discussed in Section 3.3, and average hours and wages for the full SIPP sample before
reform, we set the slope of the supply curve equal to 0.19, and we set the slope of the demand
curve equal to −0.38. As shown in the third column of Table 7, we obtain a value of 1.72 for
b, which translates into $3,566 annually for a full-time worker. This number is somewhat smaller
than the rough cost of ESHI estimated from the Kaiser survey data of $6,105. We obtain an
estimated value of 0.68 for the penalty-and-subsidy-inclusive valuation, which suggests that workers
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value health expenditures made by their employers at about $0.68 per $1.33 The magnitude of the
penalty-and-subsidy-inclusive valuation is quite high. In fact, the 95 percent condence interval for
the penalty-and-subsidy-inclusive valuation ranges up to 0.94.
Next, we translate the penalty-and-subsidy-inclusive valuation into the deadweight loss of mandate-
based health reform for individuals who have ESHI after reform, depicted as triangle F ′AF ′′ in the
theoretical and empirical gures. The area of the triangle is equal to 0.260, which translates into
an annual deadweight loss of $13.54(= 0.260 × 52) for a full-time worker. This deadweight loss is
only 10 percent of the size of the deadweight loss triangle associated with tax-based reform TAT ′,
assuming that the tax τ is equal to the cost of the benet to employers b.
Finally, we calculate the deadweight loss of mandate-based health reform for individuals who
do not have ESHI after reform, which requires an estimate of ρ. Rather than estimating ρ using
equilibrium B, we calibrate it such that the dollar value of the employer penalty ρb is equal to
the statutory penalty of $295/year. We plot the analog of equilibrium B that corresponds to the
calibrated ρ as the point Bρ. The associated welfare triangle is given by BρAB
′. The empirical area
of this triangle is 0.0176, which translates into an annual deadweight loss of $0.92(= 0.0176×52) for
a full-time worker. This relatively small deadweight loss is not surprising given the small employer
penalty in Massachusetts.
To obtain the deadweight loss of mandate-based health reform, DWLm, we weight the two
triangles by ESHI status in Massachusetts after reform, setting ESHIAfter equal to 0.74, according
to our table of summary statistics. Putting everything together using Equation (1), we nd that
the deadweight loss of mandate-based health reform is equal to $10 per year for a full-time worker.
Relative to tax-based health reform, mandate-based health reform is substantially more ecient:
using Equation (2), we calculateDWLm/DWLτ = 0.077; the distortions that mandate-based health
reform induces are only 8 percent of the distortions induced by tax-based health reform.34 The
condence interval reported in Table 7 suggests that we are 95 percent certain that the deadweight
loss of mandate-based health reform is between 1.2 percent and 26.5 percent of the deadweight loss
of tax-based health reform. This substantial eciency is perhaps not surprising as it follows directly
from our estimate of a relatively high penalty-and-subsidy-inclusive valuation for ESHI.
33As discussed in our theory, the estimate of $0.68 per $1 includes the tax preference for ESHI. Based on income,
the vast majority of respondents in our sample fall in the 10 and 15 percent brackets (less than 20 percent fall in the
other possible 25, 28, 33, and 35 percent brackets). However, these tax brackets overstate actual marginal tax rates
because approximately 46 percent of households actually pay no federal income tax because of exemptions (Johnson
et al. 2011). State and payroll taxes increase all marginal tax rates by approximately 10 percent. Therefore, most of
our respondents have a penalty-and-subsidy-inclusive valuation of at least 48 cents on the dollar, excluding the tax
preference, which is still quite high.
34We nd that the deadweight loss of tax-based health reform is $134 per year for a full-time worker. A tax of
size τ = b = $1.71 per hour, would raise $2,429 per person per year ($1.71 per hour × (30.26 hours per week in
Massachusetts before reform - 3.01 hours per week after reform) × 52 weeks per year), which would not be large
enough to nance the estimated average annual cost of ESHI per worker of $3,566. Even if we only require that
tax-based reform insure as many individuals as mandate-based reform, 95 percent of individuals in the Massachusetts
experience, the government would still need to collect $3,387 per worker ($3, 566×0.95). Therefore, we are conservative
in setting τ = b. Under the tax, the ratio of the deadweight loss to revenue raised is 0.06, which is on the lower end of
the range but consistent with prominent estimates from the literature such as Ballard, Shoven, and Whalley (1985)
and Feldstein (1999).
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5.5 Robustness of the Empirical Results
In Appendix C, we consider the robustness of the empirical results. In Appendix C.1, we examine the
robustness of our empirical results to the calibrated values, and we show that our main nding that
the deadweight loss of mandate-based health reform is substantially smaller than the deadweight
loss of tax-based health reform is robust to a wide range of calibrated values. In Appendix C.2, we
examine robustness to the estimation sample and show that the results are similar when we restrict
our sample to individuals in New England and married individuals. In Appendix C.3, we examine
continuous workers separately from workers who move into and out of employment, and we nd
that we still observe a compensating dierential among continuous workers. Finally, in Appendix
C.4, we show that our results are not robust to the exclusion of individual xed eectsindividual
xed eects are essential to identication.
5.6 Implications for National Reform
The impact of mandate-based reform in Massachusetts is, of course, interesting its own right. How-
ever, because the Massachusetts reform bore all of the same key features as national health reform,
we can use our model and our estimates to reach some conclusions about the potential welfare im-
pact of the ACA. While we do not model all of the underlying structure that would be required to
fully predict the impact of national reform, because of the many similarities between both reforms,
given our sucient statistics approach, we expect the welfare impacts to be similar to the extent
the policy parameters are equivalent in Massachusetts and under the ACA. Since the magnitudes
of the individual penalty, employer penalty, and subsidies dier across the reforms, we can use our
model to consider the robustness of our main conclusions. We can also use our model to consider
the impact of other dierences between Massachusetts and the rest of the nation.
The relatively larger individual penalty under the ACA suggests that the national reform could
be even more ecient than the Massachusetts reform. The individual penalty increases the penalty-
and-subsidy-inclusive valuation, decreasing distortion. Thus, while the labor market distortion of
mandate-based health reform in Massachusetts was only 8 percent of the distortion of tax-based
health reform, a larger individual penalty would decrease the ratio even further. On the other
hand, the employer penalty is also larger under ACA than it is in Massachusetts, which increases
distortion. In practice, the size of the employer penalty is unlikely to change our basic conclusions
on the eciency of mandate-based reform. As we show in Appendix C.1, our nding that mandate-
based health reform is substantially more ecient than tax-based health reform is robust to the
larger value of the penalty.
Subsidies under national reform extend to a larger population because incomes are lower outside
of Massachusetts and subsidy thresholds are higher under national reform, increasing distortion to
the labor market. However, the subsidy dollar amounts are lower under national reform, decreasing
distortion. Adding further complexity to the comparison, the recent Supreme Court decision on the
ACA eliminated the ability of the federal government to require that states expand Medicaid or face
a complete elimination of existing Medicaid funds. This decision might reduce subsidies available
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in some states under the ACA, decreasing distortion.
Even if the statutory parameters were the same, rms and individuals outside of Massachusetts
could respond dierently to reform. For example, some analysts predict that rms will be less
likely to oer ESHI and individuals will be less likely to take up ESHI under national reform. Our
model treats a rm's decision to oer health insurance and an individual's decision to take up heath
insurance as exogenous, largely because we do not observe whether a rm oers health insurance in
our datawe only observe individuals who take up ESHI. However, were we to extend our model,
we would predict that the larger employer penalties under the ACA would result in larger ESHI
oer rates. We would also predict that the dierent tax incentives under the ACA would result in
larger employee ESHI take up ratesunder the ACA, the tax advantage for the employee portion of
premiums will only be available for plans oered by employers, even though Massachusetts employees
could pay pretax for plans oered by the Connector (Massachusetts DHCFP 2011a). The larger
ESHI oer rates would increase labor market distortion, but the larger valuation of ESHI would
decrease labor market distortion relative to what we observed in Massachusetts.
Finally, there could be general equilibrium changes to health insurance markets under national
reform that our analysis of the Massachusetts reform does not capture. For example, compliance
with the reform in Massachusetts was high, mitigating adverse selection in the market for health
insurance outside of employment (see Hackmann, Kolstad, and Kowalski [2012] for evidence of ad-
verse selection in Massachusetts prior to the reform). If compliance with national reform is not as
high, adverse selection could remain high in the market for health insurance outside of employment,
making the outside alternative to ESHI less attractive. In terms of our model, although adverse
selection in the non-employer-sponsored market should not aect the cost of health insurance to
employers b, it could aect the value of a dollar of ESHI relative to a dollar of wages α because em-
ployees will value ESHI more if their outside health insurance option is more expensive. In that case,
more adverse selection in the market for health insurance outside of employment nationally could
actually decrease the reform-induced distortion to the labor market relative to what we observed in
Massachusetts.
6 Conclusion
The recent Massachusetts and national health reforms are the most profound changes to health
policy in the United States since the introduction of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965. Since employers
sponsor the majority of health insurance coverage for the nonelderly in the United States, changes
to health policy can aect the labor market profoundly. To study the relationship between health
reform and the labor market, we develop a model that incorporates the three key elements of
mandate-based health reform: employer and individual pay-or-play mandates and expansions in
subsidized coverage. Using our model, we characterize the compensating dierential for ESHI. We
also characterize the welfare impact of the labor market distortion induced by health reform in terms
of a small number of sucient statistics that can be recovered from labor market outcomes. Our
model accounts for the complex set of underlying preferences for insurance, capturing them simply
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as the willingness to trade o monetary wages for employer-sponsored health insurance coverage.
Using variation from the Massachusetts reformwhich includes the same mandate-based reform
elements as the national reformwe estimate our model using longitudinal data from the Survey
of Income and Program Participation.
We nd evidence of a substantial compensating dierential for ESHI: full-time workers who
gained coverage because of the Massachusetts reform earned lower wages than they would have had
they not gained ESHI by $2,812 per year, a signicant portion of the average cost of their health
insurance to their employers. Our nding stands in stark contrast to the results from the extensive
literature that searches for a compensating dierential for ESHI but does not nd one. Because
of diculties with identication, studies generally nd that individuals with ESHI have higher
wages than those without. A small number of studies do nd evidence in favor of a compensating
dierential, showing that wages for workers with ESHI decrease as health insurance costs increase.
However, these studies use variation in incremental changes in the cost of health insurance. We
identify the compensating dierential using variation in the entire cost of health insurance using
reform-induced exogenous transitions into and out of ESHI.
Building on our estimated compensating dierential, we estimate the welfare impact of the labor
market distortion induced by health reform. Our large estimated compensating dierential indi-
cates that individuals who gained ESHI were willing to accept lower wages because they valued
the coverage that they received. We estimate that individuals who gained coverage through their
employers valued approximately $0.68 of every dollar that their employers spent on their coverage.
Because individuals valued ESHI, mandate-based health reform in Massachusetts resulted in signif-
icantly less distortion to the labor market than it would have under alternative policies to expand
insurance coverage. We estimate that if the government had instead increased insurance coverage by
establishing a wage tax to pay for health insurance, the distortion to the labor market would have
been roughly 13 times as large. Our results suggest that mandate-based reform has the potential
to be a very ecient approach for expanding health insurance coverage nationally.
Finally, our results help to explain why ESHI coverage increased in Massachusetts relative to
other states following reform, despite anticipation that other sources of coverage would crowd out
ESHI (see Kolstad and Kowalski [2012]). Although it seemed plausible that employers would stop
oering coverage, instead of electing to pay the small employer penalty, between 2005 and 2009,
the rate of employers oering ESHI increased from 70 percent to 76 percent in Massachusetts while
it remained at nationally (Massachusetts DHCFP 2011a). Our model and results suggest that
the individual mandate, combined with the large penalty-and-subsidy-inclusive valuation of ESHI,
encouraged workers to demand ESHI from their employers, which they paid for out of decreased
wages. If employers have a comparative advantage in oering health plans that their employees
value, then we expect crowd-in to ESHIprecisely what we observed in Massachusetts. To the
extent that ESHI is even more valuable relative to other coverage under national reform than it was
in Massachusetts, perhaps because of the dierence in the relative tax preference between reforms,
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Appendix A Massachusetts and National Reform Comparison
Table A1: Summary of Labor Market Provisions in Massachusetts and National Reforms
 
 Massachusetts Health Care Reform, 
April 2006 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(PPACA), March 2010 
“Large” Employer At least 11 employees1,2 At least 50 full-time employees3 
Provisions Affecting 
Large Employers 
Must either:  
• Offer employees the option to purchase 
health coverage,5 OR 
• Pay an annual penalty per employee1 
 
In addition, employers: 
• Must offer the option to pay the premium 
using pre-tax wages5 
• Are not required to contribute towards 
the premium (but may pay penalties if 
they do not)5 
Must either: 
• Offer employees affordable health 
coverage options,4 OR 
• Pay an annual penalty per employee3 
 
Affordable coverage defined as: 
• Insurance coverage at least 60% of 
covered expenses,3 AND 
• Employees not required to pay more 
than 9.5% of family income for 
coverage3,4 
“Small” Employer Fewer than 11 employees Fewer than 50 employees 
Provisions Affecting 
Small Employers 
May purchase coverage for employees via the 
Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector, 
which:1 
• Offers access to health insurance options 
approved by a State board 
• Merges the individual and small business 
insurance markets 
Very small businesses (fewer than 25 employees) 
may: 
• Be eligible for a tax credit for offering 




Must pay a penalty of $295 per employee per year, 
if: 
• The employer does not offer health 
insurance options,1 OR  
• The employer contributes less than 33% 
of the premium2  
 
Must also pay a penalty if employees use the 
uncompensated care pool2  
Two types of penalties: 
• Must pay $2,000 per full-time employee 
for not offering any insurance options3,4 
• Must pay $3,000 (up to a maximum) for 
not offering affordable coverage, for all 
employees receiving a tax credit for 
insurance purchased on exchange3,4 
Penalties increase annually for premium growth. 
Not assessed for first 30 employees3,4 
Provisions Affecting 
Individuals 
Individuals are required either to: 
• Buy creditable health insurance,1,7 OR 
• Pay a penalty, if the cost of coverage has 
been deemed affordable6,7 
 
Individuals with incomes below 300% of poverty 
can access subsidized health insurance:7 
• <150% of poverty pay no premium1 
• 151-200% pay $35 per month1 
• Up to 300% receive subsidies 
Individuals are required either to: 
• Purchase “qualifying” health coverage,8 
OR 
• Pay a penalty, with some exemptions 
available8 
 
Provides subsidies/access to coverage for low-
income individuals: 
• <133% of poverty become eligible for 
Medicaid coverage, effectively 138% 
after deducting 5% of poverty8,9 
• Up to 400% receive premium/cost-
sharing credits towards purchase via the 
exchanges. Credits increase with 
income, limiting contributions from 2% 
to 9.5% of income8 
Penalties (Individuals) Individuals who do not purchase affordable 
coverage, but are in income brackets with 
affordable coverage available, face penalties:7 
• Initially, $219 per individual 
• Starting in 2008, up to 50% of the cost of 
the least expensive coverage 
Individuals not purchasing coverage face a penalty 
of the greater of: 
• $695 (annually) to a maximum of three 
times this amount,8 OR 
• 2.5% of household income8 
These amounts phased in beginning in 20148 
 
Notes: (1) Kaiser Family Foundation (2007a), (2) Felland et al (2007), (3) Kaiser Family Foundation (2010d), (4) Anonymous (2011), (5) 
Commonwealth Connector (2007), (6) Kaiser Family Foundation (2009), (7) Kaiser Family Foundation (2010b), (8)  Kaiser Family Foundation 
(2010c). 
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Appendix B Comparison of SIPP to Alternative Survey Data
Figures B1 and B2 plot wages and hours in Massachusetts and non-Massachusetts states between
2004 and 2011 for three data sets in addition to the SIPP: the CPS, the MEPS, and the ACS. We
also include data from the 2008 SIPP panel. It is clear that the 2004 SIPP panel captures the same
trends as the other datasets, with the only deviation coming from an uptick in the last period of
observation. As we discuss, the last period of observation is aected by attrition from the sample
in the last survey month and, and though an uptick is visible, it does not impact our estimation
substantially due to the weighting of the regression results. The 2008 SIPP panel continues with
trends similar to the remainder of the country and to the 2004 SIPP panel.
We also note that the last period of the 2008 SIPP panel appears to have an uptick in wages,
suggesting that the attrition from the sample we see in the 2004 panel is a general issue with the
SIPP and does not reect an unobserved change in Massachusetts the last two months of 2007.
Taken together, these trends suggest that the 2004 SIPP is representative of Massachusetts and
control states and does not obscure substantial change in Massachusetts in the period after our
data ends (2008 onwards).
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  to	  calculate	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  (set	  to	  missing).	  	  
Survey	  weights	  are	  used	  to	  calculate	  means.	  
Appendix C Robustness of the Empirical Results
Appendix C.1 Robustness to Calibrated Values
Thus far, we have discussed point estimates for the welfare impact of health reform, but we are also
interested in their robustness. Although the reported condence intervals should be of the correct
size for the compensating and hours dierentials, the other condence intervals should be too small
because they reect calibrated values, which were themselves estimated elsewhere. Therefore, it is
instructive to consider robustness to alternative calibrated values.
First consider alternative values of ρ and ESHIAfter. These values have little impact on our
overall conclusion that mandate-based health reform is substantially more ecient than tax-based
health reform in Massachusetts. Our preferred calibrated ρ is 0.083, reecting that the statutory
employer penalty of $295 is approximately 8.3 percent of the estimated cost of ESHI b̂. If we increase
ρ such that the penalty is instead 31.8 percent of the estimated cost of ESHI, the deadweight loss
for individuals without ESHI after reform is equal to the deadweight loss for individuals with ESHI
after reform, which is approximately 10 percent of the deadweight loss of mandate-based health
reform. In this case, ESHIAfter has no impact because the size of both triangles is the same.
As discussed in Section 1, employer penalties under the ACA are substantially larger than those
under the Massachusetts reform, up to a maximum of $3,000 per employee annually, approximately
84 percent of the estimated cost of ESHI. However, the deadweight loss for individuals without
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ESHI after mandate-based reform is only 7.7 percent of the deadweight loss of tax-based reform;
this is because triangle BρAB
′ grows with the square of the penalty, but triangle TAT ′ grows with
the square of the cost of ESHI. Taking into account the triangle F ′AF ′′, the overall welfare cost of
mandate-based reform is only 25.9 percent of the welfare cost of tax-based reform.
Next, consider alternative values for the loading cost of ESHI relative to the loading cost of
government-provided health insurance, b/τ , keeping all other values the same as in our full spec-
ication. Suppose that ESHI costs 10 percent more to provide than government-provided health
insurance because the government has economies of scale relative to employers, so b/τ=1.1. The
deadweight loss of tax-based health reform decreases to $111 annually, but the deadweight loss of
mandate-based health reform is still only 9.3 percent as large. Even if b/τ=1.50 such that ESHI
costs 50 percent more to provide than government-provided health insurance, the deadweight loss
of mandate-based health reform is still only 17.2 percent of the deadweight loss of tax-based health
reform.
The last calibrated values to consider are the slope of the supply curve s and the slope of the
demand curve d. To examine the eect of s and d on the ratio of the deadweight loss of mandate-
based health reform to the deadweight loss of tax-based health reform, we see from Equation (2)
that the ratio of the deadweight loss of mandate-based health reform to the deadweight loss of tax-
based health reform grows with the square of the percentage of the cost of ESHI that workers do not
value: (1− ̂α+ λ− µx). Using the expressions in Table 3, we can express this percentage in terms
of the compensating and hours dierentials, the slope of the demand curve, and the slope of the
supply curve. We nd that the relative deadweight loss of mandate-based reform increases as the
slope of the labor supply curve increases (becomes more inelastic) and increases as the slope of the
labor demand curve decreases (becomes more elastic). Holding demand constant, if we increase the
calibrated labor supply elasticity from 0.1 to 0.2 (from s = 0.19 to s = 0.38), the relative deadweight
loss increases to 14.5 percent. If we increase it further to 0.3 (s = 0.57), the relative deadweight loss
increases to 20.7 percent. Alternatively, holding supply constant, if we decrease the calibrated labor
demand elasticity from -0.2 to -0.4 (from d = −0.38 to d = −0.76), the relative deadweight loss
increases to 14.3 percent. If we decrease it further to -1.2 (d = −2.28), the relative deadweight loss
increases to 33.1 percent. Thus, the nding that mandate-based health reform is ecient relative
to tax-based health reform is robust to changes in calibrated labor supply and demand.
The slopes of the supply and demand curves do, however, x the incidence of the deadweight
loss of health reform on employees versus their employers. As we can see from Figure 5, as supply
becomes less elastic, a larger fraction of each deadweight loss triangle is below the L axis, demon-
strating that employees bear more of the burden of reform. Conversely, as demand becomes less
elastic, a larger fraction of each deadweight loss triangle is above the L axis, demonstrating that
employers bear more of the burden of reform.
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Appendix C.2 Robustness to Dierent Estimation Samples
Thus far, our model has taken individual ESHI takeup decisions as exogenous. Therefore, indi-
viduals who switched into ESHI because of reform are representative of all individuals, and we
have estimated the penalty-and-subsidy-inclusive valuation for the population. However, we can
extend our model to make ESHI status endogenous by allowing underlying valuations, and thus
penalty-and-subsidy-inclusive valuations, to vary across individuals. In this extended model, af-
ter allowing for some optimization error, individuals with a penalty-and-subsidy-inclusive valuation
above a certain threshold purchase health insurance in each period. Individuals with the highest
intrinsic valuation of health insurance α already have health insurance before reform. The reform
will increase penalty-and-subsidy-inclusive valuations for some individuals, leading them to take up
ESHI. Interpreted in light of the extended model, our estimates then reect the average penalty-
and-subsidy-inclusive valuation among individuals who take up ESHI. Therefore, our estimated
valuation of 0.68 from our full specication suggests that individuals who take up ESHI because of
reform value it at 68 cents on the dollar on average (after incorporating the individual penalty and
taking the tax-preference for ESHI into account).
Under the extended model with endogenous takeup of ESHI, we can test whether the penalty-
and-subsidy-inclusive valuation (and thus the incidence of reform among employees) varies across
dierent populations by estimating our model on subsets of our estimation sample. Under our
original model, the same specications test the robustness of our estimates to alternative samples
and control groups. We examine our baseline and full specications on two subsets of the full
population: individuals in New England and individuals who are married.
In the rst column of Tables C1 and C2, we restrict our estimation sample to include only
individuals in New England, on the grounds that Massachusetts might be more similar to other
New England states than it is to the rest of the country. Table C1 reports results from the baseline
specication on the New England sample. The estimates of β1 and γ1 (the compensating and hours
dierentials assuming that the employer penalty is zero, respectively), are slightly larger in magni-
tude than the corresponding estimates from the baseline specication. However, the compensating
and hours dierentials from the full specication are very similar to those from the full sample.
In the sample that includes only New England, the annualized estimate of the cost of ESHI b is
$10,997, much larger than our preferred estimate ($3,566), but the penalty-and-subsidy-inclusive
valuation of 0.89 is also closer to 1 than our preferred estimate of 0.68. Furthermore, the ratio of
the deadweight loss of mandate-based health reform to the ratio of the deadweight loss of tax-based
health reform is 0.1 percentwhich is smaller but qualitatively similar to our preferred estimate of
7.7 percent.
In the second columns of Tables C1 and C2, we restrict our estimation sample to include only
married individuals. Married individuals could value ESHI less than other individuals if they have
health insurance options available through their spouses; alternatively, they could also value it more
if their spouse relies on them for insurance. Empirically, we see in Table C2 that the valuation of
ESHI for married individuals is approximately 0.56, with a 95 percent condence interval of 0.47 to
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Table C1: Results from Baseline Specication on Dierent Samples
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
SAMPLE New England Married New England Married
MA*ESHI*After -4.415*** -0.232 -1.739** 1.977***
[-7.288, -2.776] [-0.908, 0.459] [-3.235, -0.111] [1.282, 2.662]
MA*ESHI*During -1.862** 1.392*** -2.318** -0.441**
[-4.124, -0.00600] [0.941, 1.783] [-4.508, -0.237] [-1.040, -0.0510]
MA*ESHI 2.148** 0.762*** 2.149** -0.912***
[0.330, 6.524] [0.310, 1.254] [0.373, 3.995] [-1.616, -0.498]
MA*After 3.214*** 1.280*** 1.171 -1.077***
[1.885, 4.442] [0.750, 1.801] [-0.368, 2.421] [-1.662, -0.403]
MA*During 1.405** -0.820*** 2.497** 0.844***
[0.187, 3.277] [-1.258, -0.386] [0.459, 4.371] [0.511, 1.445]
ESHI*After 3.276*** -0.623* 0.742 -0.312
[1.661, 6.114] [-1.309, 0.061] [-0.869, 2.373] [-0.781, 0.407]
ESHI*During 0.806 -0.522*** -0.0560 -0.291
[-0.901, 3.097] [-0.896, -0.132] [-1.945, 2.164] [-0.576, 0.285]
ESHI 2.276 3.580*** 4.912*** 5.383***
[-1.403, 4.127] [3.077, 3.823] [2.901, 6.511] [4.803, 5.780]
After -1.107 0.231 0.613 -0.929***
[-2.166, 0.174] [-0.220, 0.681] [-0.777, 2.121] [-1.670, -0.435]
During 0.120 0.311 0.171 -0.484***
[-1.713, 1.314] [-0.0690, 0.665] [-1.754, 2.179] [-1.071, -0.160]
Observations 31,131 302,175 28,589 277,477
R-squared 0.670 0.760 0.814 0.834
Including full 18-64 population; only includes interview months.
Individual and state fixed effects included.  Monthly weights used.
 New England states include  MA, CT, NH, VT, ME, RI.
Weekly earnings / baseline hours per 
week, including individuals without a 
paid job (wage=0)
Hours per week, including individuals 
without a paid job (hours=0)
w L
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1, 95% confidence intervals reported; CIs block bootstrapped by state.
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Table C2: Results from Full Specication on Dierent Samples
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
SAMPLE New England Married New England Married New England Married
MA*ESHI*After*Large -2.064 -2.135*** -4.552 3.268*** 1.792** 0.244
[-5.701, 3.948] [-4.271, -0.604] [-10.591, 3.707] [0.945, 4.444] [0.337, 5.02] [-0.143, 0.68]
MA*ESHI*During*Large -1.440 -0.820 0.109 2.078*** -3.109 -0.573**
[-4.548, 3.210] [-1.763, 0.463] [-5.145, 4.501] [0.767, 2.766] [-6.794, 1.599] [-1.277, -0.117]
MA*ESHI*Large 0.231 -2.641*** -2.189 -7.236*** 3.58 5.718***
[-2.923, 2.564] [-3.807, -1.869] [-5.624, 1.584] [-8.146, -6.311] [-0.854, 11.208] [4.279, 6.978]
MA*After*Large -1.788 -5.473*** 0.997 -6.723*** -4.897** -6.046***
[-6.598, 1.833] [-6.556, -4.119] [-5.149, 6.431] [-7.756, -4.417] [-8.274, -1.726] [-7.458, -4.838]
MA*During*Large -0.0916 -0.905** -1.576** -2.644***
[-4.982, 2.871] [-1.676, -0.0350] [-3.195, -0.116] [-3.191, -1.255]
ESHI*After*Large 1.092 0.613 3.777 -0.294 1.025 -2.293***
[-4.543, 4.444] [-0.728, 2.164] [-4.366, 9.645] [-1.378, 1.737] [-0.846, 2.314] [-3.14, -1.867]
ESHI*During*Large 0.574 0.357 0.0871 -0.411 -2.02** 0.16
[-3.709, 3.352] [-0.845, 1.217] [-4.205, 4.488] [-1.114, 0.775] [-3.239, -1.011] [-1.132, 1.02]
ESHI*Large 2.521** 1.822*** 7.145*** 6.663*** 0.028 4.43***
[0.491, 5.487] [1.045, 2.720] [3.691, 10.522] [5.728, 7.512] [-5.781, 4.955] [2.127, 5.673]
After*Large -0.358 -0.138 -2.982 -0.861 -1.023 -6.564***
[-3.577, 4.219] [-1.500, 0.873] [-8.119, 2.691] [-2.938, 0.138] [-6.464, 4.311] [-7.554, -5.091]
During*Large 0.488 -0.107 0.162 -0.199
[-2.085, 5.376] [-0.871, 0.527] [-0.966, 1.615] [-1.463, 0.501]
Large -9.536*** -2.616*** -16.532** -15.919** 0.190 0.190
[-12.211, -2.407] [-5.088, -1.644] [-20.432, -10.877] [-17.111, -6.294] - -
MA*Large 5.094 1.146* 7.034*** 14.250** -0.380 -0.380
[-2.004, 7.877] [-0.0190, 3.646] [1.269, 11.24] [4.544, 15.502] - -
MA*ESHI*After -2.838* 1.318 1.506 -0.815 0.027** 0.017***
[-7.661, 0.267] [-0.596, 3.581] [-4.096, 7.407] [-1.633, 0.788] [0.013, 0.157] [0.014, 0.02]
MA*ESHI*During -0.605 2.066*** -2.442 -2.000*** 5.285** 8.54***
[-5.702, 1.446] [0.876, 2.980] [-6.461, 1.676] [-2.543, -1.273] [0.605, 10.495] [7.089, 9.969]
MA*ESHI 1.561 2.886*** 3.214 4.943*** -0.302** -0.08***
[-1.779, 7.743] [2.053, 4.098] [-1.795, 6.294] [3.976, 5.604] [-1.307, -0.04] [-0.136, -0.036]
MA*After 4.770** 6.231*** 0.737 4.735*** 1.192** 0.642***
[1.590, 9.243] [4.948, 7.412] [-4.736, 4.965] [3.100, 5.494] [0.646, 4.039] [0.566, 0.729]
MA*During 1.442 -0.0845 3.874** 2.859*** 0.89** 0.562***
[-1.125, 6.659] [-0.958, 0.734] [0.915, 6.152] [1.977, 3.345] [0.353, 3.012] [0.474, 0.643]
ESHI*After 2.517* -1.163 -1.721 -0.0956 0.740 0.740
[-0.262, 7.354] [-3.114, 0.516] [-7.306, 3.845] [-1.306, 0.731] - -
ESHI*During 0.333 -0.825 0.128 0.0194 1.000 1.000
[-1.509, 5.335] [-1.759, 0.247] [-3.698, 4.330] [-0.646, 0.570] - -
ESHI 0.507 2.119*** -0.442 0.0171
[-4.973, 3.708] [1.065, 2.814] [-3.416, 4.156] [-0.658, 0.601]
After -0.980 0.343 2.377 -0.155 0.225*** 9.09***
[-5.060, 1.829] [-0.697, 1.561] [-1.625, 7.625] [-0.876, 1.217] [0.007, 9.272] [5.471, 12.038]
During -0.335 0.386 -0.269 -0.271 0.009*** 0.142***
[-5.164, 2.076] [-0.325, 1.224] [-2.620, 2.289] [-0.789, 0.524] [0, 5.488] [0.095, 0.205]
Observations 31,131 302,175 28,589 277,477
R-squared 0.671 0.761 0.823 0.841
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1, 95% confidence intervals reported; CIs block bootstrapped by state.
Including full 18-64 population; only includes interview months.
All specifications include individual, state, and state*large firm fixed effects.  Monthly weights used.
Large firm defined as >25 employees.
 New England states include  MA, CT, NH, VT, ME, RI.
Compensating and Hours 
Differentials, Sufficient Statistics, 
and Welfare Impact of Health 
Reform
Weekly earnings / baseline hours per 
week, including individuals without a 
paid job (wage=0)
Hours per week, including individuals 
without a paid job (hours=0)
w L
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0.64, slightly smaller than the valuation of ESHI for the full sample.
Appendix C.3 Robustness to Intensive Margin Only
Thus far, we have not distinguished the extensive margin decision of whether to work at all from
the intensive margin decision to work a dierent number of hours in our measure of L. Instead, we
have attempted to capture the broadest possible impact of reform by allowing for responses on the
intensive and extensive margins. However, previous research, including Cutler and Madrian (1998),
shows that ESHI could have dierent impacts on employment than it does on hours because ESHI
has a xed cost, regardless of hours worked. Furthermore, part-time employees often do not receive
health insurance from their employers.
We now investigate whether we observe responses on the intensive margin and whether the
distinction between the intensive and extensive margins aects our ndings. Unfortunately, our
model does not allow us to examine extensive margin decisions directly.35 Instead, we restrict
our sample to individuals who worked; eectively limiting the response to the intensive margin.
Comparing these estimates to our preferred results allows us to test whether the distinction between
extensive and intensive margin eects drives our ndings. We rst include only individuals with a
paid job and positive wages in a given period. We then further restrict our sample to include only
individuals with a paid job and positive wages over the entire period, and then further to include
only individuals with no job switch over the entire period. We adjust the calibrated values of s and
d to reect the higher average wages and hours. Because these three samples only include people
with positive wages and hours, we can also estimate logarithmic specications without losing any
information. In the logarithmic specications, our theoretical graph stays the same, the axes change
from w to log(w) and from L to log(L). With the change in axes, the compensating dierential and
the cost of the benet are percentages of wages instead of dollar amounts, and the hours dierential
is a percentage of hours. However, the units of the penalty-and-subsidy-inclusive valuation and the
deadweight loss ratio do not change.
Table C3 presents results from the baseline specication on the three samples of workers, using
levels and logarithms of the dependent variables. In all samples, our estimates of β1 give evidence
of a compensating dierential, assuming no employer penalty. The logarithmic specications show
a compensating dierential from 6 percent to 10 percent of income, broadly consistent with our
preferred results. The estimates of γ1, however, do not show any evidence of a negative hours
dierential. If anything, the eect is positive in the only specication with a coecient estimate
that is signicant at the 95 percent condence level. These results suggest that much of the small
decline in hours that we observe in the full sample is driven by the extensive margin decision of
whether to work.
In the results from the full specication restricted to workers, shown in Table C4, we continue
35Within our model, we cannot redene L as an indicator variable for having a paid job, because all individuals
with ESHI must have a paid job, so equilibrium D would always be above equilibrium F . Alternatively, if we instead
aggregate our data, dening L as the fraction of individuals with a paid job, we cannot take advantage of longitudinal
variation.
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Table C3: Results from Baseline Specication to Investigate Intensive Margin
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (1e) (1f)
w Log(w) w Log(w) w Log(w)
Weekly earnings / 
baseline hours per 
week
Weekly earnings / 
baseline hours per 
week
Weekly earnings / 
baseline hours per 
week
Weekly earnings / 
baseline hours per 
week
Weekly earnings / 
baseline hours per 
week
Weekly earnings / 
baseline hours per 
week
SAMPLE
MA*ESHI*After -2.376*** -0.100*** -2.652*** -0.0612*** -3.729*** -0.0729***
[-2.811, -1.831] [-0.124, -0.0630] [-3.422, -2.283] [-0.0850, -0.0280] [-4.233, -3.031] [-0.109, -0.0366]
MA*ESHI*During -2.044*** -0.182*** -2.496*** -0.206*** -2.554*** -0.206***
[-2.426, -1.388] [-0.202, -0.148] [-2.917, -1.736] [-0.233, -0.169] [-3.084, -1.824] [-0.243, -0.169]
MA*ESHI 1.501*** 0.108*** 1.474*** 0.100*** 1.631*** 0.106***
[1.051, 1.688] [0.0820, 0.121] [0.815, 1.778] [0.0710, 0.115] [0.906, 1.959] [0.0717, 0.141]
MA*After 2.902*** 0.126*** 3.153*** 0.0831*** 3.720*** 0.0788***
[2.526, 3.179] [0.0950, 0.144] [2.887, 3.705] [0.0510, 0.102] [3.221, 4.070] [0.0402, 0.117]
MA*During 2.229*** 0.190*** 2.706*** 0.212*** 2.627*** 0.215***
[1.741, 2.457] [0.161, 0.203] [2.093, 3.008] [0.175, 0.233] [2.061, 3.001] [0.183, 0.246]
ESHI*After -0.441* -0.0704*** -0.319 -0.0562*** -0.273 -0.0588***
[-1.001, 0.005] [-0.104, -0.0430] [-0.828, 0.353] [-0.0830, -0.0290] [-0.855, 0.235] [-0.0913, -0.0264]
ESHI*During -0.551*** -0.0421*** -0.483** -0.0361** -0.533** -0.0342**
[-0.999, -0.236] [-0.0630, -0.0220] [-1.033, -0.0370] [-0.0560, -0.00300] [-1.070, -0.0250] [-0.0622, -0.00624]
ESHI 1.827*** 0.157*** 1.786*** 0.148*** 1.753*** 0.136***
[1.527, 2.124] [0.141, 0.166] [1.491, 2.171] [0.129, 0.163] [1.381, 2.163] [0.119, 0.152]
After 1.452*** 0.129*** 1.251*** 0.103*** 0.955*** 0.0933***
[1.072, 1.743] [0.0990, 0.155] [0.739, 1.460] [0.0720, 0.124] [0.565, 1.245] [0.0606, 0.126]
During 1.058*** 0.0801*** 0.982*** 0.0705*** 0.865*** 0.0583***
[0.759, 1.430] [0.0590, 0.100] [0.618, 1.450] [0.0360, 0.0900] [0.447, 1.353] [0.0293, 0.0873]
Observations 370,996 370,996 307,438 307,438 281,624 281,624
R-squared 0.792 0.749 0.790 0.762 0.794 0.771
(2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) (2e) (2f)
L Log(L) L Log(L) L Log(L)
Hours per week Hours per week Hours per week Hours per week Hours per week Hours per week
SAMPLE
MA*ESHI*After -0.255 -0.00409 0.734*** 0.0346*** -0.0480 0.0102
[-0.594, 0.180] [-0.0190, 0.0130] [0.417, 1.286] [0.0240, 0.0590] [-0.489, 0.601] [-0.0135, 0.0338]
MA*ESHI*During -1.694*** -0.0304*** -2.217*** -0.0405*** -2.397*** -0.0461***
[-1.955, -1.366] [-0.0420, -0.0180] [-2.431, -1.635] [-0.0480, -0.0170] [-2.864, -2.017] [-0.0664, -0.0258]
MA*ESHI 1.659*** 0.0433*** 1.981*** 0.0618*** 2.191*** 0.0690***
[1.070, 1.960] [0.0240, 0.0530] [1.384, 2.348] [0.0410, 0.0740] [1.517, 2.557] [0.0418, 0.0961]
MA*After 0.657*** 0.0181** -0.643*** -0.0252*** -0.0980 -0.00888
[0.156, 0.971] [0.00100, 0.0300] [-1.301, -0.378] [-0.0490, -0.0160] [-0.868, 0.329] [-0.0336, 0.0159]
MA*During 2.137*** 0.0439*** 2.445*** 0.0521*** 2.798*** 0.0636***
[1.670, 2.371] [0.0280, 0.0520] [1.825, 2.556] [0.0260, 0.0550] [2.388, 3.153] [0.0475, 0.0796]
ESHI*After -0.827*** -0.0328*** -0.687*** -0.0267*** -0.567** -0.0248**
[-1.190, -0.493] [-0.0460, -0.0180] [-1.045, -0.229] [-0.0370, -0.00900] [-1.137, -0.193] [-0.0435, -0.00615]
ESHI*During -0.614*** -0.0235*** -0.594*** -0.0232*** -0.520*** -0.0201***
[-0.805, -0.454] [-0.0310, -0.0160] [-0.810, -0.354] [-0.0310, -0.0130] [-0.783, -0.237] [-0.0319, -0.00834]
ESHI 1.833*** 0.0684*** 1.763*** 0.0642*** 1.651*** 0.0606***
[1.593, 1.983] [0.0600, 0.0740] [1.431, 1.984] [0.0530, 0.0720] [1.343, 1.884] [0.0498, 0.0714]
After 0.857*** 0.0393*** 0.580** 0.0266*** 0.361* 0.0225**
[0.516, 1.223] [0.0260, 0.0520] [0.0850, 0.950] [0.00800, 0.0360] [-0.0550, 0.977] [0.00423, 0.0408]
During 0.728*** 0.0311*** 0.660*** 0.0286*** 0.518*** 0.0234***
[0.540, 0.952] [0.0220, 0.0400] [0.376, 0.886] [0.0170, 0.0370] [0.223, 0.832] [0.0107, 0.0361]
Observations 344,315 344,315 287,144 287,144 263,033 263,033
R-squared 0.720 0.697 0.707 0.678 0.718 0.691
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1, 95% confidence intervals reported; CIs block bootstrapped by state.
Including full 18-64 population; only includes interview months.
Individual and state fixed effects included.  Monthly weights used.
Workers with a paid job and wages>0 in 
the given period
Workers with a paid job and wages>0 
over the entire period
Workers with a paid job and wages>0 and 
no job switch over the entire period
Workers with a paid job and wages>0 in 
the given period
Workers with a paid job and wages>0 
over the entire period
Workers with a paid job and wages>0 and 
no job switch over the entire period
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Table C4: Results from Full Specication to Investigate Intensive Margin
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (1e) (1f)
w Log(w) w Log(w) w Log(w)
Weekly earnings / 
baseline hours per 
week
Weekly earnings / 
baseline hours per 
week
Weekly earnings / 
baseline hours per 
week
Weekly earnings / 
baseline hours per 
week
Weekly earnings / 
baseline hours per 
week
Weekly earnings / 
baseline hours per 
week
SAMPLE
MA*ESHI*After*Large 1.682*** 0.358*** 2.920*** 0.615*** 2.611*** 0.656***
[0.999, 2.756] [0.320, 0.419] [1.825, 3.971] [0.570, 0.679] [1.192, 3.823] [0.581, 0.732]
MA*ESHI*During*Large -0.532 0.0213 -0.0587 0.0869** 0.615 0.119***
[-1.420, 0.619] [-0.0160, 0.0720] [-1.375, 1.120] [0.0320, 0.133] [-0.871, 1.745] [0.0595, 0.178]
MA*ESHI*Large 3.124*** 0.118*** 3.564*** 0.113*** 3.264*** 0.104***
[2.681, 3.610] [0.0910, 0.141] [3.043, 4.244] [0.0890, 0.157] [2.564, 3.876] [0.0653, 0.143]
MA*After*Large -2.635*** -0.356*** -4.742*** -0.650*** -4.363*** -0.691***
[-3.584, -1.615] [-0.415, -0.309] [-5.720, -3.166] [-0.710, -0.597] [-5.596, -2.736] [-0.770, -0.612]
MA*During*Large 0.518 -0.000265 -0.242 -0.112*** -0.679 -0.140***
[-0.307, 1.654] [-0.0530, 0.0380] [-1.228, 1.392] [-0.159, -0.0590] [-1.592, 1.071] [-0.195, -0.0849]
ESHI*After*Large -0.599 -0.0695*** -0.293 -0.0681* 0.186 -0.0625*
[-1.487, 0.274] [-0.119, -0.0150] [-1.054, 0.912] [-0.107, 0.00300] [-0.891, 1.370] [-0.136, 0.0113]
ESHI*During*Large -0.00128 -0.0539** 0.420 -0.0400 0.478 -0.0367
[-0.936, 0.958] [-0.0950, -0.00800] [-0.643, 1.671] [-0.0810, 0.0180] [-0.698, 1.792] [-0.0920, 0.0185]
ESHI*Large 0.677** 0.0736*** 0.617** 0.0689*** 0.616* 0.0651***
[0.190, 1.054] [0.0510, 0.0950] [0.033, 1.241] [0.0390, 0.0990] [-0.0500, 1.184] [0.0349, 0.0952]
After*Large 0.785 0.0507* 0.814 0.0570 0.579 0.0579
[-0.302, 1.678] [-0.00700, 0.102] [-0.757, 1.764] [-0.00900, 0.0960] [-0.789, 1.789] [-0.0203, 0.136]
During*Large 0.203 0.0344 -0.123 0.0222 0.000 0.0271
[-0.968, 0.967] [-0.0130, 0.0750] [-1.639, 0.822] [-0.0350, 0.0580] [-1.586, 1.004] [-0.0275, 0.0817]
Large 1.140 0.00659 0.738 -0.0705 2.128 -0.0133
[-2.200, 1.807] [-0.110, 0.0630] [-2.727, 1.618] [-0.135, 0.0350] [-2.930, 2.768] [-0.116, 0.0896]
MA*Large -1.243 -0.0222 -1.865 -0.0336 -3.712 -0.0804
[-1.975, 2.199] [-0.0880, 0.108] [-2.739, 1.715] [-0.155, 0.0320] [-4.437, 1.479] [-0.190, 0.0288]
MA*ESHI*After -3.124*** -0.321*** -4.002*** -0.454*** -4.805*** -0.486***
[-4.075, -2.436] [-0.365, -0.288] [-5.176, -3.271] [-0.506, -0.420] [-5.881, -3.592] [-0.545, -0.426]
MA*ESHI*During -1.672*** -0.196*** -2.285*** -0.245*** -2.755*** -0.261***
[-2.408, -0.763] [-0.231, -0.151] [-3.218, -1.152] [-0.284, -0.193] [-3.774, -1.680] [-0.315, -0.207]
MA*ESHI -0.873*** 0.0167 -1.234*** 0.00925 -0.749** 0.0260
[-1.444, -0.531] [-0.0150, 0.0400] [-2.051, -0.739] [-0.0430, 0.0330] [-1.571, -0.197] [-0.0245, 0.0765]
MA*After 4.489*** 0.347*** 6.086*** 0.506*** 6.300*** 0.520***
[3.625, 5.099] [0.298, 0.381] [5.306, 7.042] [0.463, 0.545] [5.240, 7.104] [0.464, 0.576]
MA*During 1.879*** 0.186*** 2.774*** 0.274*** 2.916*** 0.289***
[0.693, 2.471] [0.139, 0.222] [1.276, 3.552] [0.223, 0.310] [1.450, 3.716] [0.238, 0.340]
ESHI*After -0.116 -0.0240 -0.276 -0.0123 -0.597 -0.0214
[-0.934, 0.688] [-0.0670, 0.0120] [-1.291, 0.579] [-0.0650, 0.0190] [-1.660, 0.393] [-0.0710, 0.0281]
ESHI*During -0.587 -0.00417 -0.794 -0.00678 -0.929* -0.00966
[-1.424, 0.219] [-0.0440, 0.0300] [-1.797, 0.261] [-0.0480, 0.0400] [-1.956, 0.133] [-0.0578, 0.0384]
ESHI 1.317*** 0.101*** 1.327*** 0.0960*** 1.304*** 0.0870***
[0.907, 1.717] [0.0810, 0.119] [0.677, 1.861] [0.0680, 0.123] [0.655, 1.817] [0.0600, 0.114]
After 0.969*** 0.0985*** 0.760** 0.0690*** 0.630 0.0603***
[0.390, 1.650] [0.0660, 0.141] [0.0610, 1.605] [0.0410, 0.113] [-0.201, 1.528] [0.0158, 0.105]
During 0.928*** 0.0589*** 1.043*** 0.0568*** 0.859** 0.0425*
[0.321, 1.983] [0.0280, 0.100] [0.293, 2.320] [0.0190, 0.100] [0.0400, 2.202] [-0.00371, 0.0886]
Observations 370,996 370,996 307,438 307,438 281,624 281,624
R-squared 0.792 0.750 0.790 0.763 0.794 0.772
Workers with a paid job and wages>0 in 
the given period
Workers with a paid job and wages>0 
over the entire period
Workers with a paid job and wages>0 
and no job switch over the entire period
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Table C4: Results from Full Specication to Investigate Intensive Margin (Continued)
(2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) (2e) (2f)
L Log(L) L Log(L) L Log(L)
Hours per week Hours per week Hours per week Hours per week Hours per week Hours per week
SAMPLE
MA*ESHI*After*Large 5.761*** 0.215*** 11.883*** 0.480*** 12.771*** 0.498***
[5.358, 6.567] [0.204, 0.245] [11.085, 13.147] [0.454, 0.527] [11.780, 13.719] [0.462, 0.534]
MA*ESHI*During*Large 2.377*** 0.0787*** 5.711*** 0.199*** 5.638*** 0.206***
[1.755, 2.903] [0.0540, 0.100] [4.670, 6.083] [0.154, 0.220] [4.536, 6.233] [0.162, 0.251]
MA*ESHI*Large 1.244*** 0.0544*** -0.134 0.0218 0.106 0.0248*
[0.665, 1.585] [0.0350, 0.0650] [-0.786, 0.372] [-0.00400, 0.0370] [-0.624, 0.720] [-0.00241, 0.0519]
MA*After*Large -6.243*** -0.260*** -12.60*** -0.544*** -12.21*** -0.541***
[-7.000, -5.584] [-0.288, -0.240] [-13.544, -11.280] [-0.580, -0.508] [-13.201, -11.216] [-0.578, -0.504]
MA*During*Large -2.557*** -0.0885*** -6.162*** -0.231*** -5.647*** -0.220***
[-3.209, -1.923] [-0.114, -0.0660] [-6.680, -5.331] [-0.253, -0.199] [-6.384, -4.731] [-0.253, -0.187]
ESHI*After*Large -0.828*** -0.0275*** -0.766 -0.0279 -0.692* -0.0307*
[-1.436, -0.256] [-0.0510, -0.00900] [-1.584, 0.199] [-0.0560, 0.00300] [-1.540, 0.0170] [-0.0632, 0.00182]
ESHI*During*Large -0.833*** -0.0288** -0.779** -0.0266* -0.629* -0.0246*
[-1.228, -0.294] [-0.0460, -0.00800] [-1.229, -0.152] [-0.0470, 0.00200] [-1.254, 0.0940] [-0.0514, 0.00226]
ESHI*Large 0.794*** 0.0240*** 0.651*** 0.0178*** 0.452** 0.0117
[0.530, 1.121] [0.0120, 0.0350] [0.400, 1.096] [0.00600, 0.0350] [0.0400, 0.897] [-0.00757, 0.0310]
After*Large 0.509 0.0110 0.586 0.0177 0.502 0.0185
[-0.159, 1.110] [-0.0100, 0.0320] [-0.558, 1.366] [-0.0210, 0.0440] [-0.286, 1.255] [-0.0147, 0.0518]
During*Large 0.544* 0.0120 0.601* 0.0151 0.550 0.0144
[-0.0420, 0.977] [-0.0140, 0.0330] [-0.0310, 1.046] [-0.0120, 0.0350] [-0.285, 1.120] [-0.0134, 0.0423]
Large -2.100 -0.0621 -1.527 -0.0328 -0.501 -0.0143
[-2.597, 4.995] [-0.0760, 0.258] [-2.015, 7.011] [-0.0520, 0.392] [-0.999, 6.232] [-0.0492, 0.0206]
MA*Large 2.053 0.0565 2.330 0.0429 1.400 0.0336
[-5.041, 2.853] [-0.263, 0.0840] [-6.070, 3.228] [-0.375, 0.0800] [-5.303, 2.368] [-0.0123, 0.0794]
MA*ESHI*After -3.789*** -0.131*** -6.904*** -0.268*** -8.296*** -0.303***
[-4.529, -3.252] [-0.160, -0.112] [-8.162, -6.135] [-0.311, -0.246] [-9.240, -7.228] [-0.342, -0.264]
MA*ESHI*During -3.202*** -0.0792*** -5.816*** -0.161*** -5.896*** -0.170***
[-3.724, -2.629] [-0.0970, -0.0590] [-6.137, -4.876] [-0.170, -0.125] [-6.503, -5.110] [-0.198, -0.142]
MA*ESHI 0.613** -0.00170 1.913*** 0.0380*** 2.032*** 0.0460**
[0.0220, 1.127] [-0.0210, 0.0160] [1.133, 2.608] [0.0130, 0.0650] [1.087, 2.836] [0.00541, 0.0867]
MA*After 4.601*** 0.182*** 7.600*** 0.331*** 7.656*** 0.340***
[3.841, 5.159] [0.159, 0.205] [6.397, 8.355] [0.295, 0.360] [6.571, 8.542] [0.302, 0.378]
MA*During 3.796*** 0.101*** 6.437*** 0.201*** 6.321*** 0.200***
[3.102, 4.357] [0.0780, 0.121] [5.483, 6.824] [0.166, 0.212] [5.506, 6.995] [0.172, 0.228]
ESHI*After -0.241 -0.0122 -0.177 -0.00713 -0.114 -0.00333
[-0.834, 0.356] [-0.0300, 0.0100] [-0.904, 0.647] [-0.0290, 0.0220] [-0.856, 0.604] [-0.0319, 0.0252]
ESHI*During -0.0257 -0.00173 -0.0786 -0.00428 -0.132 -0.00297
[-0.425, 0.286] [-0.0150, 0.0110] [-0.517, 0.326] [-0.0220, 0.0110] [-0.589, 0.326] [-0.0192, 0.0133]
ESHI 1.218*** 0.0491*** 1.265*** 0.0500*** 1.296*** 0.0507***
[0.876, 1.427] [0.0370, 0.0590] [0.814, 1.499] [0.0310, 0.0590] [0.758, 1.656] [0.0298, 0.0717]
After 0.542** 0.0326*** 0.225 0.0158 0.0720 0.0115
[0.0140, 1.244] [0.0130, 0.0530] [-0.504, 0.949] [-0.0100, 0.0380] [-0.551, 1.023] [-0.0145, 0.0375]
During 0.385** 0.0236*** 0.298 0.0196** 0.201 0.0151
[0.00900, 0.844] [0.0100, 0.0390] [-0.107, 0.676] [0.00400, 0.0330] [-0.263, 0.691] [-0.00387, 0.0341]
Observations 344,315 344,315 287,144 287,144 263,033 263,033
R-squared 0.720 0.698 0.708 0.679 0.718 0.691
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1, 95% confidence intervals reported; CIs block bootstrapped by state.
Including full 18-64 population; only includes interview months.
All specifications include individual, state, and state*large firm fixed effects.  Monthly weights used.
Large firm defined as >25 employees.
Workers with a paid job and wages>0 in 
the given period
Workers with a paid job and wages>0 
over the entire period
Workers with a paid job and wages>0 
and no job switch over the entire period
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Table C4: Results from Full Specication to Investigate Intensive Margin (Continued)
(3a) (3b) (3c) (3d) (3e) (3f)
w,L Log(w),Log(L) w,L Log(w),Log(L) w,L Log(w),Log(L)
2.251*** 0.135*** 2.33*** 0.123*** 2.515*** 0.130***
[1.797, 2.465] [0.11, 0.146] [1.775, 2.628] [0.098, 0.138] [1.789, 2.842] [0.108, 0.156]
0.809*** 0.172*** 1.248*** 0.284*** 0.321 0.300***
[0.418, 1.09] [0.125, 0.217] [0.266, 1.371] [0.244, 0.312] [-0.467, 0.725] [0.253, 0.338]
4.886*** 0.49*** 7.072*** 0.773*** 6.878*** 0.821***
[3.655, 5.84] [0.432, 0.557] [4.968, 8.184] [0.714, 0.839] [4.802, 8.225] [0.747, 0.903]
-1.826*** -0.184*** -3.494*** -0.366*** -4.042*** -0.391***
[-2.779, -0.903] [-0.234, -0.138] [-4.675, -2.768] [-0.425, -0.319] [-5.132, -3.158] [-0.488, -0.381]
1.857*** 0.053*** 1.779*** 0.06*** 2.138*** 0.071***
[1.264, 2.205] [0.033, 0.063] [1.215, 2.149] [0.04, 0.073] [1.551, 2.509] [0.056, 0.093]
3.829*** 0.137*** 6.758*** 0.271*** 6.613*** 0.266***
[3.27, 4.293] [0.117, 0.154] [6.138, 7.214] [0.247, 0.294] [5.963, 7.122] [0.247, 0.294]
8.1*** 0.313*** 14.379*** 0.604*** 14.348*** 0.612***
[7.198, 8.819] [0.285, 0.341] [12.895, 15.24] [0.561, 0.64] [13.063, 15.45] [0.572, 0.665]
-2.414*** -0.123*** -5.842*** -0.273*** -5.598*** -0.275***
[-3.197, -1.649] [-0.153, -0.098] [-6.664, -4.743] [-0.308, -0.241] [-6.601, -4.718] [-0.303, -0.240]
0.170 0.100 0.170 0.100 0.170 0.100
- - - - - -
-0.350 -0.200 -0.350 -0.200 -0.350 -0.200
- - - - - -
0.053*** 0.68*** 0.026*** 0.337*** 0.024*** 0.318***
[0.037, 0.094] [0.542, 0.88] [0.02, 0.031] [0.293, 0.384] [0.019, 0.028] [0.287, 0.364]
2.671*** 0.209*** 5.538*** 0.421*** 6.001*** 0.446***
[1.523, 3.838] [0.161, 0.262] [4.629, 6.933] [0.369, 0.484] [4.992, 7.319] [0.404, 0.519]
-0.725*** -0.621*** -0.366*** -0.277*** -0.358*** -0.276***
[-1.24, -0.498] [-0.784, -0.44] [-0.426, -0.266] [-0.332, -0.204] [-0.411, -0.25] [-0.311, -0.211]
1.255*** 1.444*** 0.818*** 1.083*** 0.873*** 1.090***
[1.033, 1.576] [1.271, 1.594] [0.684, 0.923] [1.018, 1.133] [0.726, 0.934] [1.045, 1.145]
0.53*** 0.823*** 0.451*** 0.806*** 0.515*** 0.815***
[0.304, 0.641] [0.778, 0.846] [0.379, 0.552] [0.785, 0.824] [0.436, 0.579] [0.796, 0.829]
0.740 0.740 0.740 0.740 0.740 0.740
- - - - - -
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
- - - - - -
1.126*** 0.01*** 6.572*** 0.017*** 6.033*** 0.017***
[0.529, 1.971] [0.01, 0.011] [4.333, 8.549] [0.015, 0.019] [4.291, 8.39] [0.015, 0.018]
0.164*** 0.144*** 0.223*** 0.057*** 0.174*** 0.052***
[0.096, 0.361] [0.096, 0.235] [0.149, 0.285] [0.047, 0.069] [0.131, 0.236] [0.045, 0.061]
Compensating and Hours Differentials, Sufficient Statistics, and Welfare Impact of Health Reform
Workers with a paid job and wages>0 in 
the given period
Workers with a paid job and wages>0 
over the entire period
Workers with a paid job and wages>0 
and no job switch over the entire period
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to observe a compensating dierential. Interestingly, our compensating dierential ndings do not
appear to be driven exclusively by individuals who switch ESHI status by changing jobswe still
estimate a compensating dierential when we only use variation from individuals who switch ESHI
status within the same job. In all three samples, the penalty-and-subsidy-inclusive valuation is
smaller in the level specications and larger in the log specications. The ratio of the deadweight
loss of mandate-based health reform to the deadweight loss of tax-based health reform varies from 5.2
percent to 22.3 percent across all six specications, and the largest upper bound of the 95 percent
condence interval is 36.1 percent. Overall, our results that include only the intensive margin
decision are consistent with our preferred results, suggesting that the extensive margin decision of
whether to work does not drive our key ndings.
Appendix C.4 Robustness to Elimination of Individual Fixed Eects
We have argued that individual xed eects are essential to our identication. Indeed, empirically,
we show that when we exclude individual xed eects in the baseline and full specications our esti-
mate of the compensating dierential becomes substantially smaller or loses statistical signicance.
We present these results in Appendix Tables C5 and C6. These tables also show that when we
exclude individual xed eects but instead control for age, gender, marital status, race, education,
and industry, our estimated compensating dierential is only slightly larger and is not statistically
signicant. These results demonstrate that even with a large set of demographic controls, there are
still unobserved factors that bias the comparison of individuals with ESHI to those without before
compared to after reform. Therefore, the longitudinal nature of the SIPP is very important to our
analysis.
52
Table C5: Results from Baseline Specication Without Individual Fixed Eects
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
MA*ESHI*After -0.132 -0.660* 1.166*** 3.600***
[-0.646, 0.368] [-1.345, 0.0470] [0.484, 1.851] [2.824, 4.109]
MA*ESHI*During -0.424* 0.200 -0.455** 0.151
[-0.872, 0.0430] [-0.540, 1.112] [-0.869, -0.0870] [-0.276, 0.462]
MA*ESHI 3.639*** 2.323*** 1.956*** 2.342***
[2.899, 4.600] [1.631, 3.255] [1.347, 2.451] [2.012, 2.626]
MA*After 1.126*** 1.238*** 0.214 -3.024***
[0.772, 1.470] [0.612, 1.768] [-0.471, 0.905] [-3.552, -2.261]
MA*During 0.326* -0.464* 1.095*** 0.363***
[-0.0560, 0.598] [-1.245, 0.0760] [0.770, 1.534] [0.0550, 0.729]
ESHI*After -0.0148 -0.904** 1.038*** -0.197
[-0.491, 0.468] [-1.530, -0.252] [0.371, 1.763] [-0.692, 0.380]
ESHI*During -0.0802 -0.818*** 0.734*** -0.166
[-0.532, 0.347] [-1.540, -0.254] [0.361, 1.111] [-0.429, 0.149]
ESHI 12.131*** 4.599*** 15.38*** 3.195***
[11.189, 12.879] [3.993, 5.103] [14.894, 16.009] [2.960, 3.453]
After 0.254 0.814*** -1.080*** -0.103
[-0.0870, 0.595] [0.268, 1.325] [-1.747, -0.445] [-0.651, 0.414]
During 0.193 0.660*** -0.669*** 0.0140
[-0.0570, 0.544] [0.237, 1.348] [-1.068, -0.344] [-0.285, 0.244]
Controls? No Yes No Yes
Observations 543,630 400,502 499,828 369,745
R-squared 0.076 0.169 0.15 0.164
Including full 18-64 population.
Only includes interview months.
State fixed effects included, no individual fixed effects.  Monthly weights used.
Estimations with controls control for age, gender, marital status, race, education, and industry.
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1, 95% confidence intervals reported; CIs block bootstrapped by state.
Weekly earnings / baseline hours per week, 
including individuals without a paid job 
(wage=0)
w
Hours per week, including individuals without 
a paid job (hours=0)
L
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Table C6: Results from Full Specication Without Individual Fixed Eects
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
MA*ESHI*After*Large 0.912 -1.452** -1.666** 0.154 3.657*** 1.977***
[-0.317, 2.147] [-2.302, -0.244] [-2.904, -0.570] [-0.779, 1.288] [2.854, 4.702] [1.225, 3.067]
MA*ESHI*During*Large -2.418*** -2.075*** -0.277 0.615* 3.863*** 1.313**
[-3.527, -1.287] [-3.415, -0.672] [-0.789, 0.258] [-0.0570, 1.190] [2.763, 5.064] [0.165, 2.724]
MA*ESHI*Large 0.710*** -0.836* -0.340 0.829*** 6.012*** 2.67***
[0.320, 1.349] [-1.361, 0.0250] [-1.256, 0.406] [0.284, 1.273] [5.275, 6.934] [1.695, 3.888]
MA*After*Large -2.355*** -0.693 1.626*** -1.406*** 1.508** 0.62
[-3.019, -1.653] [-1.732, 0.333] [0.593, 2.819] [-2.282, -0.530] [0.396, 3.195] [-0.781, 2.319]
MA*During*Large 1.198*** -0.246 0.596** -0.993***
[0.632, 1.794] [-1.243, 0.630] [0.0520, 1.147] [-1.484, -0.388]
ESHI*After*Large 0.296 -1.372*** 0.568 -0.625 1.395*** 2.43***
[-0.951, 1.457] [-2.294, -0.450] [-0.594, 1.651] [-1.635, 0.379] [0.78, 1.914] [2.048, 2.725]
ESHI*During*Large 0.693 -0.361 0.411 -0.550** 2.708*** 6.415***
[-0.410, 1.776] [-1.663, 0.804] [-0.152, 0.936] [-1.057, -0.0530] [1.793, 3.652] [5.611, 6.91]
ESHI*Large 6.317*** 2.230*** 16.770*** 2.029*** -0.231 3.836***
[5.685, 6.753] [1.646, 2.635] [16.024, 17.685] [1.646, 2.512] [-1.539, 0.941] [2.877, 4.608]
After*Large -0.0896 1.348*** -0.844 0.258 4.334*** 5.009***
[-0.815, 0.561] [0.560, 1.971] [-1.999, 0.242] [-0.607, 1.009] [3.272, 5.337] [3.831, 5.79]
During*Large -0.383 0.575 -0.474* 0.367
[-0.963, 0.246] [-0.200, 1.576] [-1.045, 0.0630] [-0.226, 0.839]
Large -4.987*** 0.972 -19.596** 1.755 0.190 0.190
[-9.625, -4.398] [-2.351, 1.708] [-26.838, -17.745] [-0.408, 2.186] - -
MA*Large -0.565 1.243* 1.634 -0.954 -0.380 -0.380
[-1.389, 4.066] [-0.0180, 4.564] [-0.118, 8.972] [-1.445, 1.168] - -
MA*ESHI*After -0.706 0.788* 2.979*** 3.832*** -0.045*** -0.056***
[-1.764, 0.264] [-0.115, 1.706] [1.843, 3.909] [2.750, 4.684] [-0.072, -0.029] [-0.136, -0.034]
MA*ESHI*During 1.577*** 2.124*** -0.231 -0.130 -3.155*** -2.524***
[0.638, 2.579] [1.168, 3.366] [-0.748, 0.289] [-0.560, 0.351] [-4.926, -1.958] [-4.123, -1.046]
MA*ESHI 2.948*** 2.813*** 1.735*** 1.601*** 1.075*** 0.601***
[2.159, 3.845] [2.079, 3.511] [1.345, 2.232] [1.202, 2.016] [0.875, 1.459] [0.449, 1.11]
MA*After 2.941*** 1.608*** -1.615*** -2.126*** -0.858*** -0.732***
[2.349, 3.490] [0.833, 2.323] [-2.519, -0.612] [-2.834, -1.092] [-1.577, -0.413] [-2.633, -0.202]
MA*During -0.618*** -0.428* 0.602** 0.992*** 0.217 -0.131
[-1.078, -0.226] [-1.127, 0.0400] [0.0980, 1.071] [0.536, 1.404] [-0.199, 0.498] [-1.616, 0.394]
ESHI*After -0.284 -0.0596 0.443 0.278 0.740 0.740
[-1.279, 0.757] [-0.923, 0.740] [-0.469, 1.604] [-0.516, 1.347] - -
ESHI*During -0.675 -0.652 0.287 0.231 1.000 1.000
[-1.626, 0.249] [-1.614, 0.146] [-0.214, 0.797] [-0.142, 0.675] - -
ESHI 7.036*** 2.705*** 2.136*** 1.506***
[6.152, 7.797] [2.100, 3.411] [1.642, 2.560] [1.074, 1.878]
After 0.352 0.0193 -0.287 -0.256 3.966*** 5.296***
[-0.204, 0.938] [-0.561, 0.632] [-1.182, 0.607] [-1.076, 0.584] [2.266, 6.012] [3.1, 7.075]
During 0.520** 0.324 -0.189 -0.221 0.454*** 0.948***
[0.0750, 0.968] [-0.156, 0.766] [-0.671, 0.313] [-0.641, 0.227] [0.187, 1.066] [0.272, 5.071]
Controls? No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 543,630 400,502 499,828 369,745
R-squared 0.081 0.172 0.214 0.171
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1, 95% confidence intervals reported; CIs block bootstrapped by state.
Including full 18-64 population; only includes interview months.
All specifications include state and state*large firm fixed effects, no individual fixed effects.  Monthly weights used.
Estimations with controls control for age, gender, marital status, race, education, and industry.
Large firm defined as >25 employees.
Compensating and Hours Differentials, 
Sufficient Statistics, and Welfare Impact of 
Health Reform
Hours per week, including individuals 
without a paid job (hours=0)
L
Weekly earnings / baseline hours per 
week, including individuals without a paid 
job (wage=0)
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